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The 2020 Vision initiative of the International Food Policy Research Institute
(IFPRI) was launched late in 1993, at a time of growing global complacency regarding
international food security questions.  The first phase of the 2020 Vision initiative
(1993–96) featured the development of an innovative forward-looking partial equilibrium
model of the international food and agriculture sector; the hosting of an extensive series
of high profile conferences, workshops, and regional meetings; the publication and
distribution of numerous substantive discussion papers, policy briefs, and regional
synthesis papers; and the regular publication of a topical newsletter.  The goal was to
refocus attention on current and future challenges in areas such as food security,
agricultural development, rural poverty, and environmental protection; to catalyze a new
consensus on these issues within the international policy community; and to encourage
policy leaders—both in the donor community and in the developing world—to commit
more energy and resources to resolve food security concerns. 
The present report is an independent effort, commissioned by IFPRI, to measure
the actual impact, to date, of this ongoing 2020 Vision initiative.  The impacts examined
include impacts on three different audiences:  researchers and educators, international
policy leaders, and developing-country policy leaders.  For each of these audiences, an
assessment is given as to whether the 2020 Vision initiative significantly “reached” the
audience in question with its materials and messages; whether 2020 had an impact on the
policy thinking of this audience; and whether 2020 actually catalyzed any new policy
actions by this audience.  These were difficult assessments to make, since the audiences
were large, diverse, and physically dispersed, and since the thinking and behavior of these
audiences has recently been influenced by so many activities in addition to 2020.  The
information needed to make these difficult assessments was gathered from records kept
by IFPRI of 2020 conference attendees and activities, from various surveys of conference
participants, from solicited personal testimony by IFPRI staff and individuals involved in
2020 activities, from materials published by other organizations working in the food
security and agricultural development area, and from materials gathered from donors,
international organizations, and the nongovernmental organization (NGO) community.
To summarize the findings of this report, the impact of the 2020 Vision Initiative
has varied audience by audience and activity by activity.  These impacts are rated in
descending order as either highly significant, significant, noticeable, or not noticeable.
1. Within the first community of international researchers and educators (this is
IFPRI’s traditional audience), 2020 has had a HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT impact. 
2020 has successfully reached this first audience with numerous 2020 materials,
and many of those materials have been extended—through subsequentiv
duplication, citation, or classroom use—to an even wider circle of potentially
influential individuals.
2. Within a second community of international policy leaders, the 2020 Vision
initiative has had several kinds of impact:
< 2020’s success in reaching this second community has been HIGHLY
SIGNIFICANT, in the sense that numerous 2020 materials were consumed
by the most important members of this second audience group, and many
in this group were direct participants in 2020 Vision activities.
< 2020’s success in catalyzing a consensus within this second community is
assessed as SIGNIFICANT.  IFPRI’s IMPACT model projections and
other materials have become a visible part of the policy debate for most in
this second audience, and for some (especially in the donor and NGO
communities) a highly visible part of their thinking.  The 2020 Vision
initiative was also relatively successful in bringing skeptics and non-
specialists from this second audience into a discussion of rural poverty and
agricultural development issues.
< 2020’s success in catalyzing new policy actions by this second community
was assessed as NOTICEABLE.  Here, the most important goal was to
reverse the mood of complacency among international donors, and reverse
the fall in financial resources committed by donors to agricultural research
and to agricultural and rural development.  Aggregate levels of multilateral
and bilateral donor support to agriculture continued to fall during the first
four years of the 2020 Vision initiative, but this fall was eventually halted
in 1997–98, and in some cases it was noticeably reversed, and in some of
these cases the 2020 Vision initiative played a noticeable role in this
reversal.  
3. A third audience, policy leaders  within  the developing world, was not the
primary target audience of the first phase (1993–96) of the 2020 Vision initiative.
Still, some impacts were noted here: 
< 2020’s success in reaching this third audience with materials was
surprisingly SIGNIFICANT.  A number of influential developing-country
leaders did consume 2020 materials and did participate in 2020 Vision
activities.
< 2020’s success in catalyzing a new consensus within this third audience
was uneven but in some cases NOTICEABLE.  Regional 2020 Vision
statements were developed, refined, and discussed among developing
country policy leaders in Africa, Latin America, and South Asia, and otherv
2020 materials did at times enter the policy debate inside some developing
countries, strengthening the hand of advocates for agriculture.
< 2020’s success in catalyzing new policy actions among developing country
governments was assessed, so far, as NOT NOTICEABLE.  In some cases
developing-country governments took policy actions of the kind that 2020
might favor, yet establishing a direct causal link to the 2020 Vision
initiative in these cases proved difficult. Catalyzing action in the
developing world was not, however, the primary goal of 2020 in its first
phase. 
Catalyzing policy actions within developing countries is precisely where a new
second phase of the 2020 Vision initiative will concentrate its energies.  The distinctive
feature of this Phase II of 2020 is the creation of “subregional networks” (initially, in East
and West Africa) where African policy leaders and technocrats will engage in country-
level  2020 visioning efforts.  At the first substantive meetings of these subregional
networks,  late in 1998, African researchers and government officials developed country-
level strategy papers suitable not only for building a stronger internal policy consensus,
but also for guiding donors in search of fundable projects in the food and agricultural
sectors.
In summary, from the vantage point of early 1999, the impacts of the 2020 Vision
initiative already emerge as substantial.  At times these impacts have been significant or
even highly significant, and in most other instances they have at least been noticeable. 
These significant impacts have also been highly cost-effective, as indicated by the tiny
share of IFPRI’s budget outlays  (just 5 percent annually) devoted to its 2020 Vision
initiative.  Within the international donor community, the 2020 Vision initiative has in
several instances had a noticeable positive effect on actual resource commitment
decisions.  Governments in the developing world were a secondary focus during much of
the first phase of 2020, yet even here significant impacts were felt on policy debate.  The
goal of the second phase of 2020 will be to produce significant impacts on policy action
inside developing-country governments as well. vi
TERMS OF REFERENCE
This impact assessment has been undertaken within the terms of a June 1998
research agreement (9806200.PAA) between the International Food Policy Research
Institute (IFPRI) and Robert Paarlberg, Professor of Political Science at Wellesley
College.  The terms of reference for that agreement call for:
“...an independent external assessment of the 2020 Vision initiative’s
impact since its launch, specifically vis-à-vis its two primary objectives: (i)
to develop and promote a shared vision and consensus for action for
meeting food needs while reducing poverty and protecting the
environment; and (ii) to generate information and encourage debate to
influence action by national governments, nongovernmental organizations,
the private sector, international development institutions, and civil
society.” 
In undertaking this assessment, Paarlberg was offered the support of a small
advisory committee, drawn from membership of IFPRI’s larger 2020 Vision International
Advisory Committee.  He was provided a complete set of 2020 publications from 1994 to
the present, a complete list of 2020 meetings and presentations from 1994 to the present,
a copy of IFPRI’s Third External Programme and Management Review (February 1998), 
results of a Beresford Group survey of 2020 Vision readers (June 1997), a summary of
2020 communication activities from 1993 to the present, a copy of IFPRI’s 1998
submission of the 2020 Vision initiative for the CGIAR King Baudouin Award, and a
copy of IFPRI’s 1998 annual report.  He was also given IFPRI staff support in
administering a survey of 2020 event participants; he was invited to interview relevant
IFPRI staff; he was given access to those IFPRI board members who attended a
December 1998 meeting; he was helped in making contacts with informants at
International Centers Week 1998 in Washington, D.C.; and he was invited to attend and
participate in the first meeting of IFPRI’s 2020 Vision Network for East Africa, in
October 1998, in Entebbe, Uganda.  
Paarlberg’s own position and previous contacts with IFPRI deserve brief
clarification.  Paarlberg is a U.S. citizen, and an independent scholar (political scientist)
who writes on international agricultural policy issues.  He has served as Scientific Liaison
Officer between the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and IFPRI’s
board.  In 1994 Paarlberg authored 2020 Vision Brief No. 4, on “Sustainable Farming: A
Political Geography.” In 1996 Paarlberg chaired an internally commissioned external
review (ICER) of IFPRI’s methodologies, including the outreach methods used by 2020. In 1997, Paarlberg co-authored a Ford Foundation-funded IFPRI study of agricultural
policymaking processes and institutions in Uganda. 
IFPRI’S 2020 VISION INITIATIVE:  INTENDED IMPACTS
The 2020 Vision initiative was launched late in 1993, at a time of global
complacency regarding international food security questions.  World grain stocks were
high, international prices were low, and partly as a result external assistance for
agricultural development was falling.  Total external assistance to agriculture had fallen
from a peak level of $17 billion dollars in 1988, to only $11 billion in 1993, and down to
less than $10 billion in 1994 (FAO 1996, Document 10, Table 6).  Support for
international agricultural research was also in decline.  Core funding for the Consultative
Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) system (of which IFPRI is a part)
had declined in real terms (after inflation) by 11 percent in 1993, and another 10 percent
decline was projected for 1994 (Action Group on Food Security 1994, Table 3).    
IFPRI’s (then) new director general, Per Pinstrup-Andersen responded to this
complacency about future world food circumstances by launching a new “initiative”
within the institute.  Beginning late in 1993, IFPRI sought to refocus attention and
stimulate debate on critical world food issues by initiating a new series of research reports
and publications designed for wide popular distribution, and by organizing a series of
seminars and workshops on specific food security topics and geographic regions in the
developing world.  In the first two years of this 2020 Vision initiative, in 1994–95, IFPRI
published 9 special discussion papers, 29 short policy briefs, and organized 35 meetings
and presentations to stimulate discussion and debate.  The signature event in these first
two years was an international conference (“A 2020 Vision for Food, Agriculture, and the
Environment”) held in Washington, D.C. in June 1995, attended by 500 people from 50
different countries, where some 30 speakers made presentations.  
IFPRI’s central policy message at this June 1995 conference was summarized by
the director general in three main points:
< Although the current global food situation might seem safe, as we move
toward 2020, tremendous human suffering will continue due to food
insecurity, hunger, and malnutrition in large parts of the world, and natural
resource degradation will remain rampant.
< The world’s natural resources are sufficient to remove this suffering by
2020, but political will may be lacking.
< Removing this suffering by 2020 will require, first of all, policies designed
to improve the performance of developing-country agricultural sectors
(Pinstrup-Andersen 1995). External Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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In order to conceptualize and quantify this message, economists at IFPRI had
constructed a new global food model (the IMPACT model) capable of testing the effects
of different policies on long-term food balances.  A baseline run of this model confirmed
that world food prices would continue to decline in the future, yet at the same time food
security for hundreds of millions would not improve, and in some regions (Sub-Saharan
Africa) numbers of malnourished might continue to increase.  An even more troubling
result was generated from a run of this model that assumed a continued decline in public
investments in agricultural research.  Under this scenario, world food prices would stop
declining and the bleak nutritional picture would become even worse (Rosegrant 1995).
For the remainder of 1995, and also into 1996–97, IFPRI pressed its 2020 Vision
message by publishing more discussion papers (13 more in 1996–97), more policy briefs
(18 more in 1996–97), three regional synthesis papers (for Sub-Saharan Africa, South
Asia, Latin America), 6 books or booklets, 2 policy reports, and regular editions of a 2020
News & Views newsletter.  The 2020 Vision message unveiled at the June 1995
conference was also extended globally, through several dozen follow-up symposia, plus
personal presentations by the director general and staff at meetings in Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, South Africa, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, and in other countries as well.
Phase I of the 2020 Vision initiative formally concluded in December 1996.  A
follow-on Phase II was initiated in January 1997.  In this second phase, IMPACT
modeling is to be refined and improved, and the international communication and
consensus building efforts will continue, but a new activity is being undertaken as well. 
An effort will be made to help individual developing countries design and implement
their own 2020 strategies, at the national level.  This part of the Phase II effort is now
concentrated in Africa, where national-level visioning efforts are being done
collaboratively through two subregional networks, one in East Africa and one in West
Africa.  The East African network includes participation by policy officials and
technocrats (organized as “country teams”) from Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania,
Uganda, and (as an observer thus far) Ethiopia.  The West African network includes
participation by Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Senegal, Togo, and
(as an observer) Niger.  IFPRI’s director general, along with IFPRI’s 2020 coordinator
and network coordinator, participated in the first formal meetings of these two
subregional networks in Entebbe, Uganda, and Accra, Ghana, in October 1998.
Because of the high activity level of the 2020 Vision initiative, and also because
of the highly visible participation of the director general in so many different 2020
activities, an impression might be gained that IFPRI, since 1994, has largely given itself
over to the 2020 Vision project.  This would be an erroneous impression.  The 2020
budget is only about 5 percent of IFPRI’s total budget on an annual basis.  Almost allExternal Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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2020 work has taken place in addition to the more traditional research programs of the
Institute.  The small staff and budget resources allocated to 2020 at IFPRI do not compete
significantly with the much larger staff and budget resources available to the core
activities of the four research divisions of the institute These divisions continue to
conduct 11 multicountry programs (MPs), five global research programs (GRPs), and two
synthesis activities (SYNs).  Formally, the 2020 Vision initiative is listed at IFPRI as a
sixth GRP, managed out of the director general’s office.  IFPRI’s total staff consists of
138 people, and only two of these (the 2020 coordinator and regional coordinator) spend
a majority of their time on 2020 Vision activities. 
In its first phase, the 2020 Vision initiative was managed by a full-time
coordinator between the spring of 1994 and the autumn of 1995. Since March 1998, it has
been managed in its second phase by one full-time, senior-level coordinator in the
director general’s office.  This coordinator will soon be established in a separate office,
reporting to the director general.  The 2020 coordinator collaborates with IFPRI’s
research divisions and reports monthly to IFPRI’s senior management team.  Much of
2020’s publication work is done with the assistance of external collaborators (half of
2020’s discussion papers have been authored by non-IFPRI personnel) and many 2020
activities are partnerships or are co-hosted with non-IFPRI institutes and organizations (
for example, the East and West African subregional networks, co-hosted with local
partners, or the June 1998 workshop to develop a 2020 Vision for South Asia, co-hosted
with the Marga Institute in Colombo, Sri Lanka).
 Except for the coordinator’s salary, the 2020 Vision initiative has been funded
from a special projects budget, not IFPRI’s core budget.  And, since the launching of the
2020 Vision, IFPRI’s total staff and budget resources have increased significantly,
suggesting that the initiative has helped other institute activities to grow.  Between 1992
and the end of 1997, IFPRI’s overall funding level increased by nearly 40 percent, and its
staffing level (which had actually been in decline through 1993) increased by nearly 25
percent (TAC 1998).  This growth in total staffing and funding was largely attributable to
growth in numbers of donors to IFPRI (from 32 donors in 1992 to 43 in 1997), and many
of these donors have given specifically to the 2020 Vision initiative.  
At least 25 separate donors have contributed directly to 2020, including
foundations, traditional bilateral donors, some private-sector donors (such as Ciba-
Geigy), some NGOs (such as World Vision), and a number of international institutions
(such as the United Nations Environment Programme, the United Nations Children’s
Fund, and the United Nations Development Programme).  This diversity in 2020’s donor
base has been a self-conscious goal.  In 1998, the 2020 Vision initiative received funding
support from six different donors:  the Canadian International Development Agency
(CIDA), the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), the InternationalExternal Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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Development Research Centre (IDRC), the Swedish Agency for Development
Cooperation (SIDA), USAID, and World Vision Relief and Development, Inc. 
In sum, the 2020 Vision initiative has not been a replacement for IFPRI’s
traditional research activities, but rather it has been an attempt to leverage the strong
research reputation of the institute into a wider arena of international communication,
consensus building, and policy mobilization.   
MEASURING IMPACT
Impact assessment efforts have recently come into fashion within the CGIAR. 
They are promoted formally by an Impact Assessment and Evaluation Group (IAEG),
created in 1995.  This IAEG produced a pilot annual system-wide report on CGIAR
impacts in 1997; a second annual report was then produced in 1998.  The methods used
for these system-wide annual reports were highly informal.  Impact claims were solicited
by the IAEG and self-reported by individual centers, without substantial independent
evaluation.  Currently under way in the IAEG is a somewhat more rigorous impact
assessment of the CGIAR’s crop germplasm improvement efforts on food production,
with a report expected at the mid-term meeting in 2000.  A study of the impact of CGIAR
innovations on poverty is expected by October 2000 (IAEG 1998a).  
IFPRI’s own impact submissions to the IAEG have included both 2020 and non-
2020 activities.  Yet the impact measurement methods presented through the IAEG are
not especially well suited to the 2020 Vision initiative, which focuses more on
communication and consensus building than on basic research, and more on policy
change than on material changes such as germplasm improvement.
The impact measurement approach used here is one designed around the multiple
intent and multi-phased nature of the 2020 Vision initiative itself.  The stated intent of the
initiative, in both its phases, has been to catalyze consensus and action among a variety of
international audience groups.  Here we shall structure our evaluation of 2020’s success
precisely along these two dimensions.  We first consider impact by audience group and
then by the intended activities  of these audience groups.    
MEASURING IMPACT BY AUDIENCE
The 2020 Vision initiative in its various phases has been intended for three
distinct audience groups:  
< Researchers and educators
< Policy leaders outside of the developing worldExternal Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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< Policy leaders inside the developing world
Of these three audience groups, the first has been easiest for IFPRI to reach in the
past, and the third may be the most important for IFPRI to reach in the long run.  An
impact assessment must determine the extent to which each of these groups has been
reached and influenced by the 2020 Vision initiative.  We define these three audience
groups more precisely as follows:
Researchers and educators would include policy researchers first of all, but also
other researchers (beyond as well as inside the CGIAR system) in a position to create and
diffuse new knowledge on international hunger, poverty, and environmentally sustainable
food production.  These researchers might be inside universities, or government research
organizations (such as Kenya Agricultural Research Institute, in Kenya, or the Economic
Research Service at the U.S. Department of Agriculture), or international financial
institutions (such as the World Bank), or private companies, think tanks, or NGOs.  Many
influential educators inside school systems and universities do not conduct their own
research but are positioned to extend research results to their students and to other
audiences.  This first audience is an important one for IFPRI to reach, yet in the short run
it may have limited influence on government policy.  It was precisely a desire to reach
beyond this traditional audience of like-minded researchers that motivated the 2020
Vision initiative in the first place.  
Policy leaders outside of the developing world  would include individuals with
either decisionmaking or budget authority within donor government ministries,
parliaments, assistance agencies, international financial institutions, the private sector,
NGOs, or the media.  This important audience resides primarily in Europe, North
America, Australia, and Japan.  Like IFPRI itself, the members of this audience frequent
Washington, D.C., and frequently speak or write in English.  Unlike professionals at
IFPRI, however, this audience group does not conduct research or frequently read
scholarly journals, and most individuals in this second audience group know (or perhaps
care) very little about agricultural development.  It was the ill-informed complacency of
this second audience group that triggered IFPRI’s decision to launch the 2020 Vision
initiative in 1993.
Policy leaders and advisers in the developing world  make up a third audience
group.  Included in this critical group are politicians (elected or otherwise) inside
developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America; government ministers plus the
trained technocrats and civil servants who support them (mostly inside agricultural, food,
finance, and planning ministries); influential local NGO spokespersons; local private
sector leaders; and the local media.  This is an audience group that does not conduct
policy research.  Some in this audience read scholarly journals, but most do not.  SomeExternal Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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attend international meetings where scholarly research is presented and discussed, and
some read technical publications from international institutes on a regular basis, but many
in this group have limited access to such materials.  Many in this third audience can read
in English as well as in their own language, but many cannot.  While some members of
this third audience travel internationally on a regular basis, others are physically distant
from IFPRI and hard to reach from the industrial world.   
Most of the unsolved food, rural poverty, and environmental problems addressed
by IFPRI’s researchers can be found within the developing countries where this third
audience group resides.  Yet some members of this third audience group are not only
physically remote from IFPRI, they may also be physically remote from poor rural village
environments within their own societies.  Policy leaders in many poor countries today are
urban-born, urban-trained, urban-oriented, and as a result they may be urban-biased. 
Sometimes no less than policy leaders in rich countries, they are prone to distraction from
issues of agricultural productivity, rural poverty, and rural resource protection.  
Influencing this third audience group will be most critical to IFPRI’s final success,
since the policy and budget decisions IFPRI cares most about are firmly in the hands of
this third audience group.  Yet the physical dispersion of this third audience group, plus
the cultural and physical distance between this third group and IFPRI, has traditionally
made direct influence a challenging proposition, and it has made indirect influence, by
first influencing researchers or international policy leaders, equally uncertain.  It was in
hopes of reaching this challenging third audience directly, that IFPRI launched the Phase
II national-level activities of its 2020 Vision initiative in 1997.  
MEASURING IMPACT BY ACTIVITY
Within these various audience groups, IFPRI’s 2020 Vision initiative seeks to
catalyze consensus and ultimately various kinds of action.  A sequence of increasingly
difficult steps must be taken to achieve these final impact goals. In some cases the 2020
Vision initiative may get materials to an audience, but those materials will never be
consumed.  In other cases where those materials are consumed, they may still have no
visible impact on consensus formation or on the content of debate.  And even if a new
consensus is catalyzed, new actions or resource commitments may be slow to follow. 
Here we shall attempt to classify 2020 impacts in an ascending order as reach only
impacts, or reach and catalyze consensus only, or as impacts that have ultimately
catalyzed both consensus and action.  It will naturally be easiest for IFPRI to reach an
audience, more difficult to catalyze a consensus within that audience, and more difficult
still to catalyze new actions by that group.External Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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Attribution becomes an issue at this point.  Certifying that any given activity has
been a direct or indirect result of 2020, as opposed to being the result of some other
influence, is not a simple task, and it becomes more difficult as we go from one activity
level to the next.  
< We can easily enough certify that 2020 has “reached” an audience group, if we
can show that 2020 materials have been received and consumed by members of
that group, or if we can show that group members have participated actively in
2020 activities.  The size of the 2020 mailing list does not suffice as evidence
here, since reaching an audience requires more than simply “contacting” that
audience, but other sources of evidence to certify reach are widely available.  
< Claiming that 2020 has “catalyzed a consensus” within an audience group is more
difficult methodologically, since regularly updated statements of policy belief will
seldom be available for the groups in question, and since it would be difficult in
any case to certify that a convergence in those statements could be traced
exclusively to the 2020 initiative, rather than to some other source of influence
(such as FAO’s 1996 World Food Summit conference in Rome).  One solution to
this problem is to seek explicit references to IFPRI’s 2020 initiative in the
published work of various audience groups; this will give a less than complete
answer, of course, since the influence of 2020 is probably more often visible in
the unpublished internal memos and documents of audience groups, which are in
turn not easily accessible to outsiders.  Another solution is to credit IFPRI with
progress on consensus building if it managed through 2020 to bring to its
meetings representatives of groups traditionally skeptical either toward the 2020
Vision message or toward each other.
< Certifying that 2020 has catalyzed new actions within an audience group will be
most difficult of all, methodologically.  Some actions by policy leaders can be
precisely described (budget resources spent, policy choices made), but attributing
those actions to 2020 rather than to some other source of influence is
exceptionally difficult.  We cannot know for certain what actions would have been
taken in the absence of 2020, since history is not a laboratory in which controlled
experiments can be run.  Even if actions advocated by 2020 have been taken (such
as more spending on agricultural research), how can we know that 2020 played
the lead in prompting that action?  Policy leaders seldom credit others for the
decisions they take, since to do so is usually bad politics.  Conversely, if budget
spending for agriculture were to fall after 2020, how could we know it would not
have fallen even more without 2020?  And how can we take into account indirect
as well as direct paths of influence, including long-term indirect impacts growingExternal Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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out of educational use of 2020 materials?  In the assessments that follow, we
address these methodological challenges on a case by case basis.  
COMBINING AUDIENCE AND ACTIVITY
Putting audience and activity together, we can imagine a two-dimensional matrix
of potential 2020 impacts, which combines different audiences across the horizontal with
different levels of activity down the vertical (Table 1).  
Table 1—Matrix of intended 2020 Vision impacts:  By audience and action
Researchers and International Developing-country
educators policy leaders policy leaders
Reach Traditional IFPRI role 2020 Vision, 2020 Vision,
especially Phase I especially Phase II
Catalyze consensus Traditional IFPRI role 2020 Vision, 2020 Vision,
especially Phase I especially Phase II
Catalyze action Traditional IFPRI role 2020 Vision, 2020 Vision,
especially Phase I especially Phase II
This matrix of intended 2020 impacts helps us to distinguish between easy versus
difficult impact goals.  The upper-left-hand cell in the matrix (“reaching researchers”)
represents the easiest—but perhaps least valuable—potential impact from 2020.  The
lower-right-hand cell (“catalyzing action among developing-country policy leaders”)
represents the most difficult and probably the most valuable long-term potential impact. 
Traditionally, IFPRI has spent a majority of its time and energy working on impacts in the
upper-left-hand portion of this matrix.  The 2020 Vision initiative was revolutionary for
IFPRI, first because in Phase I it moved more of the Institute’s outreach efforts beyond
the left-hand column (especially upper-left-hand cell) and squarely into the center
column, where catalyzing consensus and policy action among international policy leaders
(especially in the donor community) became a key emphasis.  Reaching developing-
country leaders was also important in Phase I, but it has emerged as even more important
in Phase II.  Especially in the subregional networking activities of Phase II, 2020 is now
trying to have stronger consensus building and action impacts in the far-right-hand
column, among policy leaders at the national level in the developing world.  In the
analysis that follows, efforts will be made to establish where in this matrix of potential
impacts the 2020 Vision initiative has actually produced results.External Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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The information needed to carry out this analysis has been gathered from
numerous sources and communications channels.  Information concerning which groups
have so far been reached by 2020 comes from IFPRI’s existing records of attendance at
2020 workshops and conferences, plus an existing 1997 survey of 2020 Vision readers,
plus a more select 1998 survey of workshop and conference attendees, plus various
bibliographic surveys.  Information concerning 2020’s role in catalyzing consensus comes
from these same surveys, plus publications from other groups, plus records of meetings in
which groups participated that were initially skeptical of IFPRI or of each other. 
Information concerning 2020’s role in catalyzing action comes from surveys, from public
records of government budgets and policies, and from private correspondence or
conversations with first-hand or second-hand participants in various action processes.
GROUPS REACHED THROUGH 2020
The first potential activity impact of the 2020 Vision initiative was to reach new
audiences—including policy leaders as well as researchers—with IFPRI’s latest thinking
about world food problems, rural poverty, and environmental protection in the
agricultural sector.  In pursuit of this goal, IFPRI since 1994 has organized a steady
stream of 2020 workshops and conferences, and has distributed a flood of publications.
THE REACH OF 2020 PUBLICATIONS
Up through February 1999, IFPRI had produced and distributed through the 2020
initiative a total of 7 books and booklets, 2 food policy reports, 27 discussion papers, 59
policy briefs, 5 syntheses, and 16 newsletter issues.  Roughly 394,000 separate
publications had gone to those on IFPRI’s 2020 mailing list, which contained the names
of 5,522 individuals.  Another 63,000 publications had gone to others by request.  By
region, 55 percent of mailing list recipients are in Europe or North America, while the
rest are in Asia and elsewhere in the developing world. 
All 2020 publications have been available in English, but selected items are
translated into French and Spanish.  Of those on the 2020 mailing list, 141 receive
materials in French, and 108 receive materials in Spanish.  Individual publications or
selected research results have also been translated into Danish, Dutch, German, and
Japanese.  The 2020 initiative also keeps a website, which was visited by 30,000 people
in 1998, with 22 percent of these visitors coming back 8 or more times.  During 1998
alone, IFPRI’s site received 530 separate e-mail requests for 2020 materials.  When IFPRI
first launched 2020, materials were often pushed onto intended readers; today, as often as
not, these readers are pulling materials out of IFPRI.  External Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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Of those to whom 2020 publications are mailed, how many are actually “reached”
in the more narrow sense that they have consumed these publications carefully enough to
have an opinion about them?  IFPRI could be reaching fewer people than it has on its
mailing list, since some regular recipients of 2020 materials probably never read them. 
By another line of thinking, IFPRI could be reaching many more individuals than the
5,000 on its mailing list, since its materials may not only be read by the recipient, but also
shared, copied, subdistributed to individuals not on IFPRI’s mailing list, or used in wide-
ranging training and education activities.   IFPRI’s 2020 policy briefs, in particular, lend
themselves to this kind of secondary distribution and consumption. 
At a minimum, we do know that a substantial number of those on IFPRI’s mailing
list are appreciative consumers of the 2020 materials they receive.  In 1997 the Beresford
Group (Beresford Group 1997) sent a two-page survey to all 3,356 individuals then on
IFPRI’s international 2020 publications mailing list, via the News & Views  newsletter. 
Although this was a highly indirect method of soliciting responses, a total of 452
individuals nonetheless took the trouble to complete and return the survey questionnaire
within the time allowed, a response rate of 13 percent.  The final response rate was
slightly higher, at 16 percent.  Those who replied had an overwhelmingly favorable view
of 2020 publications, with 74 percent finding these materials “very useful” and another
24 percent finding them “somewhat useful.”  
There were indirect suggestions, from this questionnaire response, that 2020
materials were being widely shared.  Of the 452 tabulated respondents to the survey, 136
(30 percent) were either teachers, journalists, or librarians, in a position to spread 2020
materials indirectly to many wider audiences.  Almost two-thirds of the respondents from
universities and educational institutions reported using 2020 materials in graduate or
undergraduate courses.  Senior academics confirm the frequent use of 2020 discussion
papers in both graduate and undergraduate curricula.  
What kinds of individuals are being reached by 2020 publications?  If we take the
demographic profile of the 452 reader survey respondents as possibly representative of
the larger profile of all being reached, we can see that 2020 materials have been moving
far beyond IFPRI’s traditional audience in the research community.  Of the 452
respondents, only 21 percent classified themselves primarily as “researchers,” whereas a
slightly larger share of these respondents (26 percent) classified themselves as primarily
policymakers, policy advisers, or journalists.  This is the “policy leader” audience that
2020 is most anxious to reach.  Most of the remainder of respondents classified
themselves primarily as teachers, librarians, or “general managers.”  Regionally, 54
percent of researchers who responded worked outside the developing world (in largely
West Europe and North America).  Of the policy leaders responding, half worked outside
of the developing world (the center column audience in the matrix shown above), andExternal Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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half were actually policy leaders within the developing world (the harder-to-reach third
column in the matrix).
Summarizing with reference to the matrix of potential impacts presented above,
we can estimate that 21 percent of those reached by 2020 publications are primarily
researchers, 13 percent are international policy leaders, and 13 percent are policy leaders
from developing countries.
THE REACH OF 2020 WORKSHOPS, CONFERENCES, AND
PRESENTATIONS
Between February 1994 and June 1998, IFPRI hosted or sponsored 88 separate
meetings devoted primarily to 2020 Vision publications or activities.  Some were two
hour briefings, some were two-to-four-day seminars, some were brainstorming sessions,
and some were consensus-building dialogues.  Significantly, all but about a dozen of
these meetings were held away from IFPRI headquarters in Washington, D.C.  Following
the international conference of June 1995, follow-up activities took place in more than 40
industrialized and developing countries around the world.
Significant numbers of individuals have been reached by these conferencing
activities, including those who attended (500 attended the June 1995 meeting alone), and
the smaller number who were active participants as invited speakers.  When asked in
1998 to compile a complete list of invited speaking participants at these various 2020
meetings, IFPRI staff assembled a list of 213 individuals, from around the world.  When a
confidential survey was then mailed (from Paarlberg) to the last known addresses of these
213 individuals in August 1998, a total of 68 of them (32 percent) eventually responded. 
We can assume that those interested or loyal enough to respond to this 1998
survey have definitely been reached by the 2020 Vision initiative.  Who are these people? 
Of the 68 respondents, 30 were researchers or administrators from research institutes
(though all but 5 were from beyond the CGIAR system), while among the 38
nonresearchers, 23 worked in the industrial world and 15 worked in the developing
world.  Compared to those reached by 2020 publications, actual speaking participants at
2020 meetings have therefore been slightly more oriented toward research (44 percent
versus 21 percent).  This reflects the fact that the role of most speakers has been to share
research results.  This group of speakers has also been more often located in the category
of “policy leaders.”  Within the developing world they have included a deputy prime
minister, regional directors and subregional representatives of UN special agencies, a
principal economist with a regional development bank, a senior adviser to a minister of
agriculture, a central bank economist, the head of a farming systems program, and chairExternal Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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of a resource-protection NGO.  This suggests that the 2020 audience has already grown to
include significant numbers of individuals from column three in the matrix above.   
The confidential opinions expressed by these speaking participants about 2020
were largely positive along two dimensions.  When asked if they had subsequently “made
professional use” of the information or of the personal contacts gained through the 2020
Vision event in which they participated, all but two of the 30 researchers said yes, and 29
of the 38 nonresearchers said yes.  When asked if their past or present associations with
2020 had helped them to be “more effective in doing their job,” 22 of the 30 researchers
said yes, and 30 of the 38 non-researchers said yes.  When this survey group was asked
parenthetically about the value of 2020 publications, 59 percent cited 2020 discussion
papers as especially useful, 47 percent cited policy briefs, and 21 percent cited the News
& Views newsletter. 
The results of this survey suggest that a substantial portion of the 213 individuals
who were invited to participate as speakers in 2020 events (judging from the 32 percent
who responded to the survey) had a positive experience, and came away from those
events personally and professionally more attentive to IFPRI research products and to the
2020 message.  One of IFPRI’s goals in designing these 2020 events was to gain the
attention of nonresearchers, especially policy leaders.  The fact that more than half of
those responding to the 1998 survey were from the “policy leader” category again
suggests that some success was achieved here.
Meetings and conferences were also indirectly useful in triggering local and
international media attention to the 2020 Vision initiative. IFPRI prepares and
disseminates news releases and invites local and international media to all major 2020
meetings.  A 2020 Vision workshop in South Africa in June 1996 was covered by 11
local newspapers.  Overall, the 2020 Vision initiative has been mentioned in more than
300 newspaper and magazine articles, including features in the New York Times,
Financial Times, Asian Wall Street Journal, Toronto Globe & Mail, Berlingske Tidende
(Denmark), Yomiuri Shinbun (Japan), and India Monitor.  Interviews with 2020
researchers and communicators have been broadcast by the BBC, CNN, Channel Earth
Television, National Public Radio, and Voice of America, plus many local radio and TV
outlets, especially within developing countries.
We may conclude in this section that the reach of 2020 Vision publications and
meetings has been highly significant.  Phase I of 2020 has helped extend IFPRI thinking
about world food, poverty, and environmental concerns far beyond the rather narrow
cadre of researchers and academic journal readers that had earlier been the Institute’s
most attentive core audience group.  Policy leaders have been reached by this initiative,External Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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including (even in Phase I) a significant number of policy leaders in the developing
world.
CATALYZING CONSENSUS THROUGH 2020
Beyond the task of reaching influential individuals, the 2020 Vision initiative was
designed to “promote a shared vision and consensus” among those individuals.  Direct
evidence of 2020’s impact on the shape of opinion or on the direction of a policy debate
is naturally going to be harder to assemble, as noted above.  Here we shall concentrate on
two kinds of indirect evidence.  First will be evidence that 2020 has catalyzed consensus
by successfully bringing together individuals with differing points of view.  Second will
be indirect evidence of 2020’s impact on debate in the form of references to 2020 in
published, unpublished, or testimonial materials, from various members of 2020’s larger
intended audience.  
BRINGING TOGETHER DIVERSE POINTS OF VIEW
Building a consensus requires bringing together individuals with differing points
of view, especially views that differ from the 2020 Vision itself.  To assess 2020’s
performance here, we can begin by imagining three categories of individuals who
probably did not share the 2020 Vision initially, when the initiative was first launched
late in 1993.  
< First would be international policy leaders and policy advisers with little or no
background in agriculture, and hence with no clear understanding of the role
agricultural productivity growth can play in more rapid economic development
and poverty reduction, and with little knowledge of the need for regular
investments in agricultural research.  
< Second would be leaders from within the commercial private sector, who may be
well informed about the performance of food and farm markets, but who are often
less well informed about those living in rural poverty who are not visible users of
these markets.  Leaders from this sector are also not primarily concerned with the
“externalized” environmental effects of markets.  
< Third would be nonagriculturalist leaders from private foundations or the NGO
community (or elsewhere within the noncommercial private sector), who are often
attentive to poverty and environmental externalities but have recently grownExternal Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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mistrustful of markets and skeptical toward the benefits of science-based
agricultural productivity growth.  
How well represented have these various “skeptic” groups been in 2020 activities
to date, either as members of the 2020 international advisory committee, or as authors of
2020 publications, or as participants in 2020 meetings and activities?
A number of nonagriculturalist public officials can be found among the members
of the 2020 international advisory committee (IAC).  Of the 47 individuals listed as
committee members on February 1, 1999, as many as half might be classified by
affiliation in this category.  Many of these IAC nonagriculturalists do, however, come
from within the larger development cooperation community.  In this regard they can be
useful instruments for increasing attention to food and agriculture within that
development community.  A problem would remain, however, of selling the 2020 Vision
to a wider political audience skeptical of all development cooperation efforts. 
The 2020 IAC does include a number of NGO representatives.  The majority,
however, are from nutrition, development, or population-oriented NGOs, rather than from
the environmental NGOs that are most prominently skeptical toward IFPRI’s embrace of
science and market-based rural development. At the same time, largely missing from the
IAC is significant representation from the profit-making private sector. The difference of
views represented within the 2020 IAC is thus significant, but mostly along a dimension
of how large a role agricultural productivity growth should play in international
development assistance and cooperation efforts.  Given the recent decline in agriculture’s
fortunes among some donor governments, it is perhaps appropriate that an IAC for 2020
has been constructed to embrace both sides of this divide within the development
community.
The authors of most 2020 publications are a less diverse group.  This is partly to
be expected, since the discussion papers (and the briefs that traditionally grew out of
these papers) have been primarily research reports, rather than pieces of advocacy.  This
avoidance by 2020 of pure advocacy tends to confine the authorship of discussion papers
and briefs to a somewhat narrow range of researchers and academics.  For consensus-
building purposes, it is advantageous that many of the researchers and academics that
have authored these publications have at least been from non-IFPRI, non-CGIAR
institutions.
While most discussion paper authors have been food or agriculturalist researchers
who largely share the professional background and vantage point of IFPRI’s own
researchers, the 2020 policy briefs have recently come to provide a more diverse set of
viewpoints.  Less than half of the briefs now being published are merely summaries ofExternal Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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longer discussion papers, and an increasing number are being authored by nonacademics. 
The current practice at IFPRI is to stress much greater diversity in the commissioning of
policy briefs.  It is now the practice to commission “collections” of six to eight separately
authored briefs around single controversial topics (for example, agricultural trade
negotiations, agribiotechnology).  This so-called “2020 Focus” format will move the
policy briefs farther away from reporting isolated academic research results and closer to
reporting differing views on current policy issues.  This could strengthen the consensus-
building capacity of 2020 considerably.  
Until now 2020 has made its most self-conscious efforts at consensus building
through publication of its News & Views newsletter, which regularly features a wide
variety of viewpoints.  A review of individual remarks directly quoted in the first 16
newsletter issues (up through November 1998) reveals quotations from a total of 187
individuals, including 28 public or government officials from nonfood or nonagricultural
organizations and 29 individuals from (primarily) nonfood or nonagricultural NGOs,
including a number of population, environmental, habitat, and gender-focused NGOs. 
One News & Views  issue that focused on the population boom quoted six different
individuals from nonfood, nonagricultural NGOs.  Another issue on environmental
matters quoted three nonfood, nonagricultural NGO spokespersons.  An issue on women
quoted five different non-food, non-agricultural individuals, including three public
officials alongside two NGO spokespersons.  News &Views  issues on urbanization and
violent conflict were comparably diverse in the sources quoted.  
Private company officials were almost never quoted directly in these News &
Views issues, but individuals obviously sympathetic to private companies (from the media
or from independent think tanks) were given room to speak.  One newsletter issue
featured two directly contrasting critiques of the 1996 World Food Summit, one from an
anti-poverty NGO leader on the left and the other from a defender of capital-intensive
farming in the United States on the right.  This kind of diversity is rare among
publications in the field of food policy and agricultural development. IFPRI’s publication
of this News & Views newsletter may be a highly indirect indicator of consensus
formation, but it is significant nonetheless, since before 2020 no publication containing
this same breadth of views on food, environmental, and developmental issues had ever
been produced.
Significant numbers of 2020 meetings and conferences have also featured the kind
of diversity that makes consensus formation possible.  In April 1995, a 2020 conference
on land degradation included not only top academics and CGIAR scientists, but also
activists, project managers, and an analyst from an environmental think tank.  A May
1995 conference on pest management included not only top representatives from several
agrochemical companies (Monsanto, Ciba-Geigy), but also a selection of environmentalExternal Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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researchers and advocates (from the World Wildlife Fund and the World Resources
Institute).  One agrochemical representative who attended this conference reported later
that “The experience of being locked up for several days with adversarial greens provided
useful insights and development for me.”  In September 1998, the 2020 project revisited
the pest management topic by hosting a panel discussion in Washington, D.C., which
featured well known participants from academia, industry, and an NGO (though in this
case it was the academic participant, rather than the NGO participant, who most directly
opposed industry).  This single panel discussion attracted more than 70 non-IFPRI
participants.  In December 1998, 120 people attended a discussion on U.S. agricultural
aid to developing countries, hosted by 2020, featuring a subcabinet level official from the
U.S. Department of Agriculture and a top official from a leading U.S. farm lobby group,
the National Association of Wheat Growers.  For consensus-building purposes, some of
IFPRI’s most successful 2020 meetings are those that bring together individuals with
divergent views.   
Not all 2020 meetings have been designed with consensus building in mind. 
Many 2020 meetings are simply briefings by IFPRI staff, which will naturally tend to
attract audiences of the already converted, and some 2020 conferences are designed from
the start to include primarily the like-minded (for example, a November 1994 conference
of mostly CGIAR scientists on “ecoregions of the developing world”).  The June 1995
Washington conference that launched the project was itself notably light on
representation by the environmental NGO community, and it attracted almost no
participation by the profit-making private sector (admittedly, not a priority audience for
2020 at that point).      
It should be noted that IFPRI as an institution is exceptionally well positioned to
pursue the consensus-building mission.  In Washington, D.C., the debate on development
policy tends to be heavily and self-consciously dominated by the World Bank, and it
therefore breaks down quickly into a polarized contest between “pro-Bank” and “anti-
Bank” views, sometimes silencing those who would want to take a middle ground.  IFPRI
researchers, who often take positions somewhere between Bank and anti-Bank views,
manage to retain credibility in both camps.  The anti-Bank camp respects IFPRI’s
emphasis on hunger alleviation and poverty reduction, while the pro-Bank camp respects
IFPRI’s technical competence.  The 2020 Vision initiative has capitalized on this
positioning and credibility advantage, by bringing individuals and institutions with
differing views into the 2020 project together, in a setting where they can talk and listen
to each other.External Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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INFLUENCING POLICY DEBATE
Beyond the bringing together of differing points of view at 2020 events or in 2020
publications, is there any evidence that the 2020 Vision initiative has influenced actual
policy debates?  Here we consider four different settings in which such an influence
might be noticed: international institutions, NGOs, donor governments, and developing-
country governments.  But first we examine 2020’s single most prominent instrument of
influence, the IMPACT computer model, which makes policy-sensitive projections about
future food production and consumption circumstances.
The IMPACT Model
Some of 2020’s strongest impacts in the area of consensus building have come
through development and use of IFPRI’s International Model for Policy Analysis of
Agricultural Commodities and Trade (IMPACT).  This global partial equilibrium model
of the food and agricultural sector covers 37 countries and regions and 18 commodities
(including livestock products).  It is specified as a set of assumed country-level supply
and demand relationships, linked through trade.  This model is capable of generating
estimates not only of future food consumption, but also lack of consumption (such as
estimates of child malnutrition).  IMPACT was used to generate the baseline and
alternative scenarios out to the year 2020 widely publicized at the June 1995 conference,
and it has been used prominently for a variety of related purposes since that time.  
The IMPACT model has brought IFPRI views and concerns about food
consumption and food markets into the arena of public debate.  Past debates about world
food prospects were often dominated by competing projections from the World Bank,
FAO, or USDA, plus the prognostications of independent think tanks such as
WorldWatch Institute.  Since development of the IMPACT model, projections from
IFPRI have routinely been included in any review of future world food balances.  In 1995,
when a heated international controversy emerged over China’s likely future grain import
needs, IFPRI emerged as a major player in this debate by using its own independent
IMPACT model projections (Huang, Rozelle, and Rosegrant 1995).  In 1998, when a
financial crisis swept through East Asia, the IMPACT model was available to generate
contingent projections for impact on food production, consumption and trade (Rosegrant
and Ringler 1998).  The IMPACT model is undergoing constant improvement.  For
example, water constraints have recently been incorporated into the model.  Pending
financial support, fisheries products might be added as well.  The 1998 Technical
Advisory Committee (TAC) of the CGIAR review suggested that IFPRI also consider
upgrading IMPACT into a full CGE model (TAC 1998, 34).    External Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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While the IMPACT model is operated by IFPRI, its results have been used or
repeated widely beyond IFPRI.  Officials inside USAID report that they value this 2020
model because it generates estimates of numbers of malnourished people, and because
IFPRI staff are so responsive in running alternative scenarios through the model.  Some
of IMPACT’s heaviest use has been within the CGIAR system itself.  Almost every
CGIAR center uses the IMPACT model in one way or another.  The director general of
the International Irrigation Management Institute reports attaching his own numbers on
water results, so as to generate additional spin-off estimates.  The director general of the
International Livestock Research Institute reports having used 2020 materials on livestock
product demand in combination with IMPACT model estimates, to improve his own
institute’s medium-term planning operations.  IMPACT model results have also been
used by the TAC, as an alternative to the less formal “congruence” analyses done by
FAO.   
Compared to the “congruence” approach used by FAO, the 2020 IMPACT model
is more credible because its assumptions are more transparent.  Even the private sector
has made use of the IMPACT model. Monsanto, after participating in a 2020 roundtable
discussion at IFPRI, asked the IMPACT model to run scenarios based on possibly large
future yield increases for various crops.  IFPRI’s policy is to make its responses to such
requests publicly available as well as available to the company in question.  Armed with
IMPACT model projections, IFPRI has emerged since 2020 as one of the top players in
public debate surrounding future world food prospects. 
The precise influence of 2020 activities (including the IMPACT model) on actual
policy debate is of course difficult to measure.  It has varied across different institutions
and settings.  One way to estimate this varying influence is to solicit testimony and
review relevant published and unpublished materials from a range of relevant institutions,
including international institutions, NGOs, donor governments, and developing country
governments.
International Institutions
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)
The 2020 Vision initiative appears to have had only a light influence on thinking
at the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the UN, no doubt because of FAO’s
heavy prior investment in developing its own institutional views on many of the same
subjects.  FAO had published its own "Agriculture Toward 2010" study just prior to the
launch of the 2020 Vision project and has naturally tended to draw most heavily on the
projections its own staff had made in this respected and widely circulated document. External Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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Also, it must be said that top leaders at FAO initially viewed IFPRI’s 2020 Vision
initiative as something of a rival activity, though this attitude has diminished with time. 
FAO staff and IFPRI maintained personally close and highly productive working
relationships throughout the period, sharing information and analyses prior to both the
2020 Vision conference of 1995 and FAO’s World Food Summit conference in Rome in
1996.  
IFPRI staff commented on the technical papers that were in preparation prior to
the Food Summit, and IFPRI’s director general gave a special 2020 seminar in Rome (at
IFAD) just prior to the formal opening of the summit.  When FAO finally published its
three volumes of technical documents for the summit (FAO 1996), it referenced 2020
only lightly in its summary statement on food production and environmental impact. In its
summary statement on food security and nutrition, both 2020 and non-2020 IFPRI
materials were referenced heavily, partly because the principal author of that section
(Joachim von Braun) had close IFPRI ties.
FAO’s policy preferences are not substantively different from most of IFPRI’s
2020 Vision themes, so influencing debate at FAO was never a strong 2020 priority.  In
the one area where FAO and 2020 have had clear differences (FAO’s preference for
stressing “high-potential areas” in Africa versus IFPRI’s emphasis on the importance of
agriculture in low-potential areas), there is little evidence that FAO’s views have been
modified as a result of 2020.
World Bank
Formal policy positions taken by agriculturalists at the World Bank seem to have
been affected only slightly by 2020.  Soon after the 2020 initiative was launched, the
Agricultural and Rural Development Division within the World Bank drafted a new rural
sector strategy.  This new strategy document, drafted between mid-1995 and mid-1996,
makes only slight reference to 2020.  The document (World Bank 1997) cites IFPRI
projections of world cereals production trends and of world urbanization trends, but it
does not borrow directly from any 2020 materials when it goes on to raise the alarm about
declining resource commitments to agriculture and agricultural research.  Senior Bank
officials presiding over the drafting of this document had been members of the 2020
international advisory committee and had participated in the 1995 Washington
conference, and these senior agricultural policy officials inside the Bank report that they
did value the 2020 Vision initiative, because they saw it reinforcing their own “reasoned
and rational discussion of food security issues.”  Yet they are reluctant to say that 2020
altered their own views in any way. External Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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2020’s larger impact inside the Bank was on nonagriculturalists, for whom issues
such as hunger or rural poverty had recently been declining in priority, and on some
senior generalists.  Ismail Serageldin, the Bank’s vice president for environmentally
sustainable development, CGIAR chair, and a member of the IAC, spoke at IFPRI’s 2020
conference in June 1995, and testified there to the influence of 2020 on his own thinking. 
He said he had “carefully followed your deliberations, read the drafts of studies produced
in preparation for this conference, and been actively engaged in some of the preparatory
events leading up to it.”  Serageldin has subsequently asserted that inside the Bank,
2020’s one-page policy briefs had been of value in convincing others to refocus on food
and agriculture.  Serageldin testifies that 2020 materials were heavily used in preparation
of the Bank’s background paper on global food supply prospects, prepared for the 1996
food summit.  Indeed, half a dozen references to 2020 materials are found within that
World Bank document (Ingco, Mitchell, and McCalla 1996).  
The impact of 2020 materials on Bank President James D. Wolfensohn is
described by some informants as less visible, partly because Wolfensohn already had
strong views on agriculture, dating from his visits to the International Maize and Wheat
Improvement Center (CIMMYT) years ago with the Rockefeller Foundation, and partly
because rural development advocates inside the Bank itself provided a more proximate
source of sensitization for him on these issues. 
Among the materials most often cited by Bank staff as influential on debate, the
most prominent is Gordon Conway’s book, The Doubly Green Revolution.  Here, IFPRI
and 2020 can claim some indirect impact, since Conway acknowledges that his writing of
this influential book was based in part on 2020 materials (he had become familiar with
IFPRI’s 2020 work while serving as an IFPRI board member).  Others testify that inside
the Bank, particularly at the critical country director level, 2020 materials and activities
have helped advocates for agriculture make their case, whenever rural development
projects have had to compete with other priorities.
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
The United Nations Development Programme, in New York, appears to have
made only slight use of any IFPRI materials, 2020 or otherwise. Individual UNDP
officials are strong supporters of 2020, and UNDP Assistant Administrator Anders
Wijkman spoke at the June 1995 conference, where he endorsed the emphasis on small
farmers that IFPRI had built into 2020, but published UNDP Human Development
Reports make little or no reference to 2020 materials or to other IFPRI materials for that
matter.  This is in part because they are seldom focused directly on rural development
issues.  The 1998 Human Development Report focused on consumption issues, and didExternal Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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make one reference to IFPRI’s 1997 policy report, a 2020 report entitled The World Food
Situation, but FAO was cited eight times in this same UNDP report (UNDP 1998).
A closer relationship between UNDP and 2020 now seems to be in the offing.
Gustave Speth, the UNDP administrator and an IAC member, has initiated closer
coordination between UNDP country representatives and the IFPRI 2020 Vision
initiative.  This coordination makes sense, given the natural synergy between many of the
national level “visioning” activities promoted by UNDP and the new national level thrust
of Phase II of 2020 at IFPRI.
World Food Programme (WFP)
Officials at WFP in Rome have drawn extensively on 2020 publications and
analyses when preparing policy proposals for presentation to their Executive Board. 
WFP's policy dialogue with its membership, on future policy directions for ?food aid for
development” drew prominently on 2020 Vision materials.
African Development Bank (ADB)
Officials at ADB drew heavily from 2020 materials and themes when drafting
their new agricultural sector strategy.
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)
 IADB has been a strong partner in the 2020 initiative, and has helped sponsor a
number of workshops in the region.  This, in turn, has fed back into IADB’s own
operations.  Ruben Echeverria, senior economist at IADB, reports having used 2020
materials to prepare internal agricultural and rural development guidelines and strategy
documents. 
Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs)
A number of private research and advocacy NGOs have made substantial use of
2020 materials.  
World Resources Institute (WRI)
WRI, a foundation funded environmental policy think tank in Washington, D.C.,
has incorporated 2020 materials directly into its periodic examinations of “food and
agriculture” issues.  For basic food production and consumption data the WRI stillExternal Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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depends most heavily on FAO, but in its forward looking analysis it turns in part to IFPRI
and 2020 materials.  The World Resources 1996–1997 report from WRI summarized
2020 projections alongside FAO projections, made explicit references to “IFPRI’s model”
(the 2020 IMPACT model), cited three 2020 publications, and ended its discussion with
an explicit reference to the 2020 Vision project and with a direct citation of six policy
steps for the future that were endorsed from early 1995, a 2020 Vision document (WRI
1996).  
Bread for the World (BFW)
BFW likewise makes heavy use of 2020 materials.  For example, BFW’s 1997
Annual Report on the State of World Hunger cites 2020 Vision projections for food
production and consumption in Africa alongside FAO’s projections for 2010 and
reproduces several vignettes on hunger, verbatim, from a 2020 Vision booklet (BFW
1997).  
BFW also made extensive use of 2020 Vision materials in the drafting of a
successful legislative proposal later introduced into the U.S. Congress, called "Africa:
Seeds of Hope."   Beginning late in 1997, Bread for the World staff drafted this measure
in part by using 2020’s Africa regional synthesis paper.  Additional information was
gathered through direct conversations with IFPRI research staff, especially Chris Delgado
(one of the authors of the synthesis document).  A wider variety of 2020 publications was
used in drafting the educational and support materials for this Seeds of Hope bill, which
BFW then mailed out to mobilize its membership.  The bill, which was passed by the
U.S. Congress in the fall of 1998, now requires USAID to develop improved plans for
microenterprise in Africa and to coordinate U.S. support for agricultural research, gives
USDA new authority to purchase commodities for food assistance, and encourages the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) to expand its work with Africa's rural
populations.  This new law also imposes reporting requirements to ensure that its
objectives are met.
Further synergies between 2020 and Bread for the World are now developing. 
BFW has been given a grant to prepare a national curriculum on agriculture for groups in
the United States, such as the Future Farmers of America, and the authors of this
curriculum are drawing heavily on 2020 Vision materials, especially 2020 issue briefs.
WorldWatch Institute
WorldWatch Institute, a highly visible private think tank operated by IAC member
Lester Brown, does not make a practice of citing IFPRI or 2020 materials, and at times
WorldWatch  projections and IFPRI’s IMPACT model projections have been sharply atExternal Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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odds.  Brown nonetheless testifies personally to the larger value of 2020 materials. 
Brown cites, in particular, a 2020 discussion paper produced in 1997 on water resources
in the 21st century.  Brown also notes the value of having IFPRI focus, more openly
through 2020, on future world food prospects, as it helps him encourage others to take a
more forward-looking view as well.
The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS)
UCS made early contact with the 2020 Vision initiative, at a half-day seminar
held at IFPRI in September 1994.  Until his untimely death early in 1999, Henry Kendall
was an IAC member.
World Vision
World Vision is the largest privately funded NGO in the world, with an annual
budget of $430 million, roughly 40 percent of which now goes for development.  In 1995,
the Washington, D.C. office of World Vision/USA drafted a "Food Security Strategy
Paper," which drew heavily on participation in 2020 briefings and events and on 2020
materials.  The principal author of the World Vision strategy paper reports finding
IFPRI’s 2020 materials to be more useful than comparable materials from the World
Bank, FAO, or USDA.  The 2020 IMPACT model projections that saw hunger
increasingly centered in Africa squared with World Vision’s own rapidly developing
interest in doing more food production work in Africa.  This new strategy paper—which
contained explicit references to the 2020 Vision project—caught the attention of top
World Vision leadership.  A synopsis of this report received a favorable response when
presented to World Vision’s international board in the fall of 1998, paving the way for
larger World Vision investments in food production work in Africa.  In its efforts to
extend valuable food production technologies in Africa, World Vision is now partnering
with a number of CGIAR centers, including most recently with IFPRI.  World Vision has
even become a modest donor to the 2020 Vision initiative. 
Consortium for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN)
The Consortium for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), a
Washington-based organization that promotes international assistance to agricultural
research and development, reports making heavy use of 2020 Vision materials.  CIESIN’s
deputy director for Washington operations values the condensed, information-rich format
of 2020 materials (making them useful for briefing busy and distracted congressional
staff, in particular).  She also values the responsiveness of IFPRI’s 2020 Vision staff, who
are able to supply her with appropriate materials on short notice.External Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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EuronAid
 In Europe, Bernd Dreesmann, secretary general of EuronAid, testifies that 2020
Vision has directly strengthened the hand of development-cooperation advocates inside
the European Union (EU), in debates over assistance policy.  Dreesmann notes that the
2020 Vision initiative helped push the EU Commission to shift its position on use of
agricultural surpluses from a traditional “food aid” posture to a more progressive “food
for development” posture, and helped in creating, within the EU, a new regulation
(number 1292/96) focused explicitly on “operations in support of food security.”  This
new regulation was the result of a multiannual policymaking process, which included EU
member states, the EU Parliament, and especially NGOs.  IFPRI’s 2020 materials were
widely used by the NGO community in particular as resources in this process.  According
to Dreesmann, “There were, of course, also other inputs from FAO, ODI, SOLAGRAL,
etc., but Vision 2020 played, as to my personal conviction, a major role due to the amount
of information it is providing.” (Dreesmann 1998). The NGO community within the EU
also used 2020 materials inside the Joint Food Security Group (JFSG), a partnership
between EuronAid and the NGO/EU Liaison Committee, and Dreesmann credits 2020
materials with assisting in the creation, inside DG-VIII, of a new Unit A1 with the name
“Environment, Rural Development and Food Security.”  Dreesmann notes this is the first
time an administrative unit has been created inside the European donor community with a
name reflecting the precise nexus of issues stressed by 2020. 
Cargill, Inc.
International corporations have also made effective use of 2020 materials. 
Cargill, Inc., often uses 2020 discussion papers and briefs.  Cargill’s public affairs
division publishes a high-circulation magazine-style Bulletin, which has drawn frequently
on IMPACT model projections and on 2020 Vision publications and briefs. 
Donor Government Agencies
IFPRI’s 2020 Vision initiative was targeted especially at the donor community in
its first phase from 1993–96, and there is abundant evidence of substantial impacts within
that community on policy debate.  Agriculturalists within the donor community have used
2020 materials to help make their case for increased attention to food and agricultural
issues.  Nonagriculturalists value these materials for their accessibility and high
information content.  Increasingly, officials from the donor community will initiate
requests for 2020 materials from IFPRI, or ask for 2020 briefings when in Washington,
D.C.  The impact of 2020 on donor community debate has nonetheless varied
considerably, with some donor agencies embracing the initiative more than others.External Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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AusAID
Direct impacts by 2020 on the policy debate have been strongly visible in
Australia.  Here, a parallel Crawford Fund effort had been under way since 1993,
supporting increased spending for international agricultural research and training in
particular.  A strong synergy developed in Australia between this Crawford Fund effort
and the 2020 Vision initiative.  Derek Tribe, senior associate at the Crawford Fund,
credits 2020 with helping reduce the stridency of environmental lobby opposition to
international agricultural research in Australia, and also with helping turn Australian farm
organizations from opponents of international research into supporters.  Tribe
acknowledges an unusually large role for 2020 in this process:  “The Fund has taken the
information released by IFPRI, and other international centres, and brought it to the
attention of appropriate authorities and communities in Australia.  In this context, the
shining example of cooperation and success has been IFPRI’s 2020 Vision...” (Tribe
1998).  2020 Vision materials were disseminated in 1996 to key politicians in Australia
and their staff, to bureaucrats, NGOs, and the media, and a national seminar was held in
Parliament House, followed by dinners at which IFPRI staff plus Australian policy
leaders spoke.  Australia’s minister of foreign affairs chose a 2020 Vision event as a
platform to announce a review of his nation’s overseas aid program and announced that a
“significant increase in support for rural development” would be one of his goals for this
internal review (ACIAR 1996). 
DANIDA
When considering 2020 impacts on policy thinking in the donor community, some
of the strongest impacts have been seen in Denmark's development agency DANIDA.  In
1996 DANIDA published an “agricultural sector policy” booklet, which cited no fewer
than 30 separate 2020 Vision books, booklets, discussion papers, and policy briefs
(DANIDA 1996).  Ebbe Schiøler, head of DANIDA’s research section, credits 2020
materials with helping to move DANIDA’s strategy formulation process in a direction
compatible with IFPRI’s Vision.  Schiøler also credits 2020 with “educating”
developmental and environmental policy specialists in the Danish media, and with
providing a healthy balance, in public debate, to some more sensationalized or alarmist
accounts of world food prospects (Schiøler 1998).  Klaus Winkel, head of DANIDA’s
Department of Research, concurs that "the information provided by 2020 Vision has
contributed to the shaping of a DANIDA policy focusing more on agricultural
development, not least in the field of research."  Winkel notes that presentations by IFPRI
staff in Denmark have been an important supplement to published 2020 materials.External Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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Deutsche Gessellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit, Gmbh (GTZ)
Officials inside Germany’s GTZ report that several 2020 discussion papers
(especially one by Badiane and Delgado 1995) were helpful in the drafting of its concept
paper on rural development in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Swedish Agency for Development Cooperation (SIDA)
Top officials in the Swedish agency SIDA report drawing upon 2020 materials
when preparing speeches about development cooperation.
CIRAD
In France, the Centre de Cooperation Internationale en Recherche Agronomique
pour le Development (CIRAD) is more of a research organization than a donor to
developing countries, yet it is an important player in policy debate.  In November 1995
CIRAD organized its own international meeting to follow up on the 2020 meeting in
Washington earlier in the year, and CIRAD has made heavy use of the 2020 IMPACT
model.  Michel Griffon, an IAC member, reports that 2020 materials have been useful at
CIRAD for the purpose of reinforcing an already strongly held conviction regarding the
importance of research, in particular.
Japan International Cooperation Agency
In Japan, IFPRI organized a one-day policy seminar on key findings of relevance
to Japan from the 2020 project in April 1995 and held a follow-up symposium one year
later.  Officials from Japan’s International Cooperation Agency attended the June 1995
meeting in Washington.  2020 materials presented at these various meetings were
translated into Japanese, at the initiative of Japanese counterparts, and were subsequently
distributed to Parliament.  Informants indicate that 2020 reports were “widely circulated
in Japan,” and were “extremely educational.” 
CIDA
2020 materials have also been conspicuously useful to development assistance
advocates inside the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Five Canadian
parliamentarians attended IFPRI’s June 1995 conference in Washington, D.C., and in
June 1996, IFPRI’s director general visited Canada and used 2020 materials to gain the
attention of skeptical politicians at a joint meeting of the Parliamentary Standing
Committees on Foreign Affairs and Agriculture.  The director general is said to have used
2020 materials to respond fully and effectively to the concerns of parliamentarians, and toExternal Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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“challenge government managers on current programming priorities.”  CIDA officials
also observe that 2020 policy briefs are “routinely” appropriated by Canadian
development assistance officials and institutes and recycled, often without direct
attribution to IFPRI, into official reports and statements.  Canadian officials continue to
show a strong interest in 2020.  Early in 1999, a delegation of 25 Canadian
parliamentarians who had heard about IFPRI through the 2020 initiative asked for a
briefing from the director general during a visit to Washington, D.C.  
USAID
In the United States, agriculturalists inside USAID testify that they value 2020
materials for their technical strength and for their utility in selling the rural development
cause to skeptical or distracted top administrators. When IFPRI launched 2020 in an
effort to revive the priority of rural development concerns, many top leaders inside
USAID were not immediately sympathetic. USAID’s top administrator since 1993, J.
Brian Atwood, has served on IFPRI’s 2020 international advisory committee and even
delivered the keynote address at the June 1995 2020 kickoff conference, yet Atwood has
been personally more committed to issues such as democratization and was not originally
drawn to concerns such as agriculture and rural development.  In this difficult
environment, agriculturalists inside USAID have welcomed the 2020 Vision initiative
and report making heavy internal use of its various products. 
Nevertheless, for the purpose of promoting a pro-agriculture consensus inside
USAID, IFPRI’s 2020 Vision initiative was apparently less influential than either FAO’s
1996 food summit or the workings of a special commission on international agricultural
development assistance sponsored in the United States in 1996–97 by the National Center
for Food and Agricultural Policy (NCFAP).  In each case, IFPRI’s 2020 Vision initiative
played at least a supporting role.   
< Food Summit:  Interagency preparations for the FAO food summit were an
important attention-focusing mechanism inside USAID prior to November 1996. 
The U.S. position paper for the summit employed 2020 projections alongside
World Bank and FAO projections (USDA 1996).  A resolution at the summit
itself then obliged the U.S. government to form an interagency working group to
develop a national food strategy to meet the summit’s objectives.  Agriculturalists
inside USAID used these summit-related activities as an opportunity to promote
their concerns.  In 1998, the Office of Economic Growth and Agricultural
Development inside USAID’s Global Bureau commissioned a study, intended to
influence USAID’s budget planning process, of what it would take to implement
the food summit goal of reducing the number of undernourished people in the
world to 400 million by the year 2015.  The consulting firm that produced thisExternal Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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study relied heavily on 2020 Vision materials and even used IFPRI’s 2020
IMPACT model in generating its core scenarios.  USAID’s follow up to the food
summit was also monitored by the U.S. university community, through the Board
for International Food and Agricultural Development (BIFAD), and the leadership
of BIFAD again used 2020 materials to make its case with the agency.
< NCFAP’s 1996–97 Commission on International Trade, Development, and
Cooperation was also important in focusing USAID’s attention on agriculture,
partly because the administrator was maneuvered by NCFAP into endorsing the
Commission’s findings at a Brookings Institution conference early in 1997, and
partly because the Commission included a number of prominent national
agricultural leaders, such as farm organization presidents, plus an influential
former administrator of USAID.  IFPRI’s 2020 Vision initiative played an
important supporting role in this NCFAP activity, however.  The NCFAP
Commission report drew heavily from 2020 materials, particularly from a 1995
study entitled Foreign Assistance to Agriculture:  A Win-Win Proposition
(Pinstrup-Andersen, Lundberg, and Garrett 1995).  In subsequent briefings of this
Commission’s findings to U.S. Congressional staff, former USAID Administrator
(and currently President of Michigan State University) Peter McPherson made a
habit of citing the numerical findings of this 2020 study to support his arguments. 
Impact on Policy Debates Within Developing Countries 
In Phase I of 2020, a majority of the initiative’s consensus-building efforts
focused on policy debates and policy leaders within the donor community, international
financial institutions, and international NGOs.  Phase I of the 2020 Vision initiative
nonetheless had a noticeable impact on policy debates within developing countries.  Some
of these were indirect impacts through the donor community (for example, when 2020
materials or viewpoints found their way into donor policies in developing countries), yet a
number of direct impacts can be confirmed as well, region by region.  
Many of these impacts in the developing world grew out of the “regional vision”
initiatives launched in Phase I of 2020.  These initiatives, led by officials from developing
countries, brought 2020 work closer to the “column three” decisionmakers and policy
leaders shown in the matrix presented earlier.   
< In Africa, two dozen researchers, technical experts, and policymakers from 15
different countries participated in a four-day workshop in Saly Portudal, Senegal,
in December 1994.  A drafting committee of eight Africans, both AnglophonesExternal Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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and Francophones, then prepared a regional vision document laying out
sustainable growth strategies and priority objectives for the next 25 years.
< In South Asia, some 19 South Asian researchers, technical experts, and officials
participated, along with IFPRI staff, in a regional workshop in Kathmandu, Nepal,
in March 1995, to produce a synthesis document laying out strategies and
objectives for the region.
< In Latin America, also in March 1995, a workshop was jointly sponsored by the
Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA), Centro
Internacional de Agricultura Tropical (CIAT), and IFPRI, in Cali, Colombia.  In
this case roughly 30 Latin American specialists participated in the workshop.
To judge the actual “impact” of such efforts, and of other Phase I 2020 efforts, at
the developing-country level requires gathering testimony from participants.  A sampling
of such testimony indicates that some noticeable impacts on the policy debate were felt. 
Africa
Significant Phase I impacts in West and Central Africa are described by Baba
Dioum, coordinator general of the Conference of Ministers of Agriculture of West and
Central Africa (CMA/WCA).  The December 1994 seminar in Senegal provided an
opportunity for significant consensus building among regional experts.  The fruits of this
effort, which were later published through 2020 in a 1995 regional synthesis document
for Sub-Saharan Africa, were then communicated at the June 1995 Washington
conference by Dioum in person.  Dioum later incorporated elements of the 2020 Vision
into the national report of Senegal to the 1996 FAO World Food Summit and the position
paper of member countries of the FAO Regional Conference held at Ouagadougou
(Dioum 1998).  Elsewhere in West Africa, a principal economist with the African
Development Bank in Abidjan testifies that 2020 materials were useful in redirecting the
funding activities of other multilateral banks and of national development programmes in
the region.
In northeast Africa, Egypt’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture
and Land Reclamation Youssuf Wally reports that the 2020 Vision initiative has provided
useful input into Egypt’s food security program planning, it has strengthened the hand of
Egyptians calling for more private sector participation in agriculture, and has helped
generate stronger financial allocations to research and extension, especially for small-
scale farmers.  In Ethiopia, 2020 materials were cited frequently at the 1997 FAO
Regional Conference in Addis Ababa, a conference which brought together the Ethiopian
president, the secretary general of the Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU), and anExternal Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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ensemble of ministers from African states.  A senior regional adviser with the UN
Economic Commission for Africa in Addis confirms that 2020 materials (especially
materials touching on water policy and investment)  have been presented to national
planners in the region and then used in local publications.
In Central Africa, high-ranking leaders from the government of Uganda have
participated from the start in 2020 Vision activities.  President of Uganda H.E. Yoweri K.
Museveni, has served from the outset as Chair of the 2020 International Advisory
Committee; the first meeting of the committee took place in Entebbe.  The Vice President
of Uganda, who is also Minister of Agriculture, Speciosa Wandira Kazibwe, delivered the
welcoming address at the June 1995 Washington conference.  The vice president stated
on that occasion that developing-country leaders wanted to be “players in this initiative,
not spectators,” and the vice president has remained in close contact with the 2020 Vision
initiative ever since.  She reports that she has become a regular consumer of 2020
materials on agricultural development and testifies to the advantage she has gained from
being able to reference 2020 materials in regular cabinet discussions, when working with
technocrats inside her own ministry, and also when engaged in substantive international
dealings with policy analysts from FAO and the World Bank.  She routinely refers to
2020 materials in discussions with other heads of state in the region.  The President of
Rwanda, in one such discussion, expressed interest in learning more about the initiative. 
With national-level payoffs from 2020 particularly in mind, Vice President Kazibwe
became an early advocate, within the International Advisory Committee, of locating more
2020 Vision activities within the developing world.
In Southern Africa, substantial regional participation from political leaders and
NGO representatives, as well as agricultural technocrats, was attracted to a 2020 Vision
symposium in June 1996, in Johannesburg.  FAO’s subregional representative for South
and East Africa reports using 2020 materials to advantage—as an alternative and a
supplement to FAO documents—when preparing presentations and speeches. 
South Asia
Some impacts on the policy debate have also been visible in South Asia,
especially following the March 1995 workshop in Kathmandu.  This workshop was co-
hosted with the Institute for Integrated Development Studies (IIDS), and the executive
chair of IIDS subsequently testified that the Kathmandu meeting provided inputs into an
Agricultural Perspective Plan then in the making in Nepal.  Statistics from 2020
documents were included in briefing materials that went to Nepal’s Ministry of
Agriculture.  A regional director for UNICEF who participated in the Kathmandu meeting
has testified to its value in bringing a forward-looking perspective to his own thinking.  A
2020 Vision regional synthesis document for South Asia was published later in 1995.  External Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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In June 1998, a second regional meeting was held to revisit the regional 2020
Vision for South Asia.  This meeting was held in collaboration with the Marga Institute,
in Colombo, Sri Lanka, and was timed to take place just prior to a scheduled meeting of
the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), so that the latest 2020
consensus could be fed into the preparations for that regional summit.  Strong Marga
Institute leadership by Godfrey Gunatilleke, who is also an IFPRI Board member, ensured
that 2020 materials were in conspicuous view at the summit.  The Marga Institute was
subsequently given primary responsibility for preparing a conceptual paper for
implementation of a social charter for South Asia.  Presumably, Marga and the other
participants in this meeting—from all the states of the region—will now be in a position
to build some of IFPRI’s 2020 Vision perspectives into that regional social charter, and
then bring 2020 themes (for example, targets on reduced child malnutrition) to the
attention of future ministerial meetings of SAARC. 
2020 Vision events, particularly the June 1995 Washington conference, also had a
noticeable impact on policy debate in India.  Union Minister of Agriculture Balram
Jakhar participated in the Washington conference and subsequently encouraged the
agricultural research community in India to initiate its own 2020 visioning exercise. 
Jakhar reports that 2020 materials have been useful to the 83 institutions participating
under the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) and helped make a strong case
in India for increasing the plan outlay from its present level of just 0.30 percent of
agricultural GDP up to the 1 percent goal advocated by 2020.  I. G. Patel confirms that
2020 materials were used by those seeking to counter a “let markets do everything” view
that emerged in India under structural adjustment.  M. S. Swaminathan confirms that the
agricultural research community in India was energized by 2020 and notes that 2020
materials have become widely available in India.  They were used in preparations for the
1996 FAO Food Summit (though several other Indian participants in 2020 Vision events
later testified that they did not find 2020 materials especially useful in their own work). 
As for overall impacts in India, Swaminathan does note that IFPRI will never be able to
rival the policy influence of an international financial institution such as the World Bank,
which can condition its loans directly on policy change.
Middle East
A number of national planners and research managers in the Middle East have
made direct use of 2020 materials, including a senior economist in the Ministry of
Agriculture in Morocco, the head of an important olive commission in Tunisia, and a
recent director of planning in the government of Jordan.  One top Jordanian official was
especially impressed with 2020 materials, became an avid reader, and asked for more
materials that were linked specifically to his country’s circumstances.  This extension of
2020 materials into national-level policy channels was initially facilitated throughExternal Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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IFPRI’s joint Mashreq/Maghreb project with ICARDA and eight countries from West
Asia and North Africa, a project that predated 2020 but then emerged as a useful venue in
which to promote 2020 materials.  The strongest impacts in this region have come with
Anglophone policy elites, and greater reach might be possible if more 2020 materials
could be translated into Arabic or French. 
Latin America
In Latin America, the 2020 Vision initiative centered initially on a core group of
about 30 researchers, technical experts, and policymakers who participated in a regional
workshop in Cali, Colombia, in March 1995.  This conference generated a regional
synthesis document, and additional publications followed.  The Inter-American
Development Bank took a strong interest in this work, and with IADB support four
follow-up workshops were then held in Latin America, more than in any other region. 
One of these was in Buenos Aires in 1996, organized by former Minister of Agriculture
Lucio G. Reca, and featured presentations from a wide range of regional agricultural
policy specialists.  The published proceedings of this conference, reproduced later in
Spanish by the Inter-American Development Bank, begin with a lengthy recap of IFPRI’s
2020 Vision initiative and its implications for Latin America.  These proceedings were
later adopted for academic use. 
In Haiti, a country where IFPRI had no prior history of operations, the 2020
Vision initiative almost had a decisive impact on policy debate.  Following his
appointment in March 1996, Haiti’s Prime Minister Rosny Smarth became interested in
the 2020 Vision initiative (his senior adviser on agriculture and the environment had
attended IFPRI’s June 1995 conference in Washington) and began plans for a national-
level 2020 conference in Haiti.  IFPRI and the World Bank offered assistance, but
conference organization never came together adequately at the Haitian end, in part due to
the prime minister’s subsequent resignation in a dispute with the former president of
Haiti.  
East Asia
Impacts on policy debate at the national level have been less conspicuous in East
Asia, perhaps because so many governments in this region were already converts to the
core of the 2020 message regarding investments in agricultural productivity growth and
broadly based rural poverty reduction.  The 2020 initiative nonetheless strengthened
IFPRI’s visibility and influence in this region, as indicated by a recent Asian
Development Bank request that IFPRI take a lead role in the design of its new rural
development strategy, and a recent request for IFPRI advice from Viet Nam, regardingExternal Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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rice market liberalization.  Without the 2020 initiative, IFPRI would probably not have
received such requests.
One of the most important national-level policy debates in Asia during Phase I of
2020 took place in China.  In 1994–95, inflationary monetary policies in China, plus
rigidities in agricultural production, trade, and input supply policy, combined to produce a
momentary surge in grain imports.  A sensationalized analysis of these imports by the
WorldWatch Institute led in China to anxieties that grain production might soon go into
decline.  Some of the resulting policy changes in China—including higher state purchase
prices for grain and more spending on agricultural research—represented the kinds of
changes that IFPRI’s 2020 Vision might support, yet there is little evidence that the 2020
initiative had any direct influence over these changes.  
China also took a number of measures, such as massive investments in grain
storage and renewed administrative controls over grain markets, which the 2020 Vision
would not so clearly support. Analysts at IFPRI  (also FAO, USDA, and the World Bank)
had rejected the exaggerated WorldWatch projections for China and had sought to
persuade Chinese officials not to panic.  IFPRI used its 2020 IMPACT model to offer
production and trade projections that would provide a more reasonable basis for policy
choice, and the elite international media (the Financial Times, for example) duly
publicized these IFPRI projections as a credible alternative to the WorldWatch view.  On
several occasions IFPRI staff presented their projections to policy audiences in Beijing,
and this diligent work to some extent may have helped inform the policy debate in China. 
It is difficult, however, to confirm any significant impact.
TRIGGERING POLICY ACTIONS THROUGH 2020
The impact of 2020 on consensus building and policy debate is important, but
even more critical for the ultimate goal of hunger or poverty reduction is the final impact
of 2020 on actual policy actions.  In this next section we look in three different settings
for evidence of actual policy changes linked to 2020: within international financial
institutions, within donor governments and institutions outside the developing world, and
within governments in the developing world.  External Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
World Bank
By far the most important supplier of public resources for agricultural
development is the World Bank.  In the previous section, we noted a modest impact from
2020 on policy debate inside the World Bank, and we cited testimony (from Ismail
Serageldin) that the 2020 initiative was useful in raising the profile of rural development
and hunger issues among the Bank’s non-agriculturalists.  In terms of actual policy
actions, were more of the Bank’s lending resources committed to hunger or rural
development programs as a result of the 2020 initiative?
Evidence of a direct 2020 impact on actual World Bank resource commitments
remains somewhat elusive.  Total World Bank lending for agriculture and rural
development, which was in decline before 2020 began, did finally stabilize and eventually
even recovered a bit following the launch of 2020, but there is no sure way to connect this
stabilization of overall lending to 2020.  
Total World Bank lending for agriculture and rural development (ARD) was in a
troublesome decline when 2020 was launched.  Between 1986 and 1993 total ARD
lending on an annual basis fell from nearly $6 billion to only $4 billion (in constant 1996
U.S. dollars).  This decline continued through 1996, when total ARD lending by the Bank
fell to just $2.7 billion.  In the next three years a small recovery did take place, as ARD
lending in 1997 increased to $4.0 billion, then dipped in 1998 to $3.2 billion, then rose a
bit again in 1999 to $4.2 billion (actual and pipeline).  Was this eventual stabilization of
Bank lending for agriculture and rural development in any way a result of the 2020 Vision
initiative?
Advocacy efforts such as 2020 were one background element to this slight
turnaround in ARD lending at the Bank, but not the only or most prominent background
element.  Much of the increased Bank lending in 1997 was going either to China (where
high grain prices and the WorldWatch alarm about import dependence were swamping all
other factors in triggering concerns for agriculture), or to formerly socialist industrial
states, such as Russia and Romania, where IFPRI’s 2020 work had never been
concentrated.  Some of the Bank’s new ARD lending was for rural infrastructure in poor
countries (such as feeder roads), which was a priority often mentioned in 2020
documents.  But independently authored World Bank documents also stressed this
priority (including the Bank’s new 1996 agricultural sector strategy), so a direct
connection to 2020 is hard to establish.    External Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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At one important moment in 1994, the Bank did increase significantly its support
for international agricultural research, but 2020 does not seem to have played a significant
role in this important gain.   As noted much earlier, core funding for the CGIAR system
was falling sharply in the early 1990s, and by 1994 it was 31 percent lower in real terms
than it had been five years earlier.   This CGIAR funding crisis was then substantially
rectified in May 1994, when the World Bank—under Serageldin’s leadership—offered
US$20 million of special matching funds as an inducement to other donors to make new
commitments.  New commitments were promptly made from other donors, and as a result
overall support for the CGIAR research agenda was increased over the next two years by
approximately 15 percent (World Bank 1997, 58). 
It appears that in May 1994, IFPRI’s still very new 2020 initiative played only a
small role in this important action.  The decisive role was played instead by an ad hoc
“Action Group on Food Security” organized by retired U.S. Ambassador Robert Blake
(from the World Resources Institute), a group that included David Bell, Jessica Tuchman
Mathews, Robert McNamara, and Peter McPherson.  Rather than hold public meetings or
try to place stories in the media or pressure legislators, this group (apparently at
McNamara’s suggestion) used personal connections to go straight to the president of the
Bank with an influential report (authored principally by Montague Yudelman) which
outlined the magnitude of the CGIAR funding crisis and recommended that the Bank step
in with stabilizing resources (Action Group on Food Security 1994, 14).  The Bank’s
president agreed with this approach and authorized Serageldin to take charge of the
financial rescue effort.   
Serageldin states that by the time of the June 1995 IFPRI conference, 2020 was
certainly helpful in “undergirding” this new Bank financing for the CGIAR, but he agrees
that the policy breakthrough came before the 2020 initiative was fully operational.  After
temporarily increasing in 1994 and 1995, total Bank financing for the CGIAR in any case
fell back somewhat in 1996 and 1997.  
DONOR GOVERNMENTS
Overall bilateral external assistance to agriculture, from donor governments in the
developed world, was in sharp decline when the 2020 Vision initiative was launched in
1993–94.  Between 1988 and 1994, bilateral external assistance to agriculture declined in
real terms by 62 percent, from $9.24 billion in 1988, to just $3.55 billion in 1994,
measured in constant 1990 U.S. dollars (FAO  1996, Document 10, Table 2).  After 1994,
this decline in bilateral external assistance to agriculture was finally halted and to some
extent reversed, at least slightly.  In both 1995 and 1996 bilateral assistance to agriculture
exceeded $4 billion in constant 1990 U.S. dollars (FAO 1998, 24). IFPRI’s 2020 VisionExternal Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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initiative did play a role in this stabilization of bilateral assistance to agriculture, although
with more success in some countries than in others. 
In terms of bilateral commitments to agriculture, FAO reports that Japan was the
major donor in 1996, accounting alone for about half of all bilateral commitments from
the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries.  Japan's official
development assistance (ODA) to international agriculture had actually been increasing at
the time 2020 was launched in 1993, in sharp contrast to the trend among other donors. 
This trend toward increased assistance to agriculture continued after 2020 was launched. 
Considering grant and credit aid together, Japan's ODA to international agriculture
increased by 55 percent between 1993 and 1997, from 104.8 billion yen up to 162.5
billion yen.  These figures do not include Japan's sizable contributions to food aid or to
international agricultural research.
What role did the 2020 Vision initiative play in sustaining this strong
performance?  A reliable answer to this question would require considerable added
research into Japanese decisionmaking processes.  Informants suggest that the impact was
at least a noticeable one.  As mentioned above, materials from the 2020 Vision project
were advantageously employed by agricultural development advocates inside Japan’s
International Cooperation Agency and were subsequently translated into Japanese and
distributed to Parliament.  It is thus plausible that Japan’s strong financial commitments
to agriculture through 1997 were in part supported by 2020 activities. 
Among the other DAC members, FAO reports that significantly increased
contributions to agriculture were also made in 1996 by Australia, Canada, and Denmark. 
Once again, IFPRI’s 2020 Vision initiative met a particularly favorable response in 1996
in each of these three critical donor countries.  The connections in these cases between
2020 Vision efforts and larger resource commitments are especially plausible: 
< AusAID.  In Australia, 2020 activities and materials had a clear and strong impact
on that nation’s actual spending levels for international agricultural research. 
When Australia’s Crawford Fund began its campaign, the national budget for
international agricultural research was Aus$11million.  The IFPRI director general
and staff made high-profile presentations of 2020 materials in Canberra in May
1996.  The Crawford Fund leveraged these 2020 Vision efforts into its own
advocacy actions. By 1998, Australia’s national budget for international
agricultural research had grown to Aus$40 million. 
< CIDA.  CIDA officials reported making substantial direct use of 2020 materials in
their battle to halt declines in Canada’s agricultural development assistance
funding, particularly following an IFPRI 2020 visit to Ottawa in June 1996. External Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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Actual spending records indicate that in 1996 CIDA’s country-to-country ODA
for agriculture did stabilize.  Agriculture spending fell sharply from Cdn$181.4
million in 1991/92 down to Cdn$65.54 in 1995/96, but then stabilized at
approximately Cdn$70 million in both 1996/97 and 1997/98.  How much credit
2020 can take for this stabilization (compared with other factors such as the FAO
food summit or higher commodity prices) is not certain, of course.  Moreover,
even with this stabilization, Canada’s country-to-country agricultural ODA
spending was substantially lower in 1997/98 than it had been in 1993/94 when the
2020 initiative began.
< DANIDA.  As noted above, IFPRI’s 2020 Vision initiative was one factor that
helped reorient DANIDA’s bilateral aid toward agricultural development.  Prior to
2020, DANIDA’s bilateral agricultural development funding had been declining
(it fell from US$77.2 million in 1992 to US$32.0 million in 1994).  Beginning in
1995, however, DANIDA began spending more on agriculture, and between
1995–98 overall, bilateral agricultural development spending recovered to an
average of US$71 million annually.  Between 1995 and 1998, the agricultural
share of total DANIDA bilateral spending also increased, from 6.7 percent up to
8.4 percent.  Officials at DANIDA describe this stronger 1998 figure as "the start
of an upward trend."  DANIDA officials acknowledge that IFPRI’s 2020 Vision
initiative contributed to this positive outcome for agriculture.
A somewhat more difficult bilateral donor for 2020 to influence was the United
States.  USAID resource commitments to agriculture were in decline before the 2020
Vision initiative was launched in 1993, and they continued in this decline for some years
after 2020 was launched, despite complaints from numerous advocacy groups and
organizations, including 2020.  Total USAID obligations in agriculture fell from $594
million in 1992, to $399 million in 1994, to $259 million in 1996, and then to a low of
$245 million in 1997 (U.S. fiscal years in each case).  Between 1992 and 1997,
agriculture’s share of the USAID budget fell from 10 percent to less than 5 percent.  In
FY 1998 and FY 1999, this fall in levels of obligations for agriculture was finally
stabilized.  In FY 1998 USAID obligations for agriculture totaled $294 million, and in FY
1999, $305 million (USAID 1998).  USAID’s funding for agriculture is currently
stabilized at roughly $300 million, and protected at that level from competing claims
through a bureaucratic device called a “soft earmark.”  
What role IFPRI’s 2020 efforts may have played in this final stabilization of U.S.
funding for agriculture is not clear.  Most informants inside USAID believe any role 2020
played was at best indirect.  Stronger and more direct contributions were apparently made
by the February 1997 NCFAP conference at the Brookings Institution (mentioned above)
at which Administrator Atwood was pressured to endorse some refocusing on agriculturalExternal Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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programs, plus follow-up lobbying on Capital Hill and inside USAID by NCFAP
commission member Peter McPherson. 
Other informants point to the pressures that had been placed on Atwood by
national stakeholding agriculturalist groups such as the Board for International Food and
Agricultural Development (BIFAD),  including pressures to produce a credible U.S.
national program following the 1996 FAO Rome Food Summit (See USAID 1998).  Still
others point to the action-forcing anticipation of President Clinton’s 1998 trip through
Africa.  Prior to this Africa trip, a Food Security Advisory Committee (FSAC) was
formed as a subcommittee of BIFAD, chaired by G. Edward Schuh (an IFPRI board
member).  This strengthened the hand of those inside USAID who argued that the fall in
spending for agriculture and food security had to be stopped.  
IFPRI’s 2020 initiative may not have played a lead role in these belated USAID
funding stabilization actions, but it did play an indirect role.  As mentioned above, the
part of the NCFAP Commission report that was referenced most often by Peter
McPherson in his lobbying efforts was the 2020 finding, prominently cited in that report,
that assistance to farming abroad was a “win-win proposition” for U.S. farmers.  The
lobby efforts of BIFAD were also in part bolstered through use of 2020 materials. Per
Pinstrup-Anderson was invited to participate in some of the interagency meetings inside
the U.S. government that led up to the President’s Africa trip, where he took the
opportunity to present 2020 materials.
When we look more narrowly at donor contributions to the CGIAR in particular,
similar contrasting patterns emerge, donor by donor.  Among European donors (both EU
and non-EU), contributions to the CGIAR increased in real terms steadily (measured in
1994 U.S. dollars) over both the 1980s and the 1990s.  In Japan, contributions to the
CGIAR increased sharply in the 1980s and during the first half of the 1990s, but then they
began a significant decline later in the 1990s, as Japan’s economy weakened.  In
Australia, contributions to international agricultural research increased nearly threefold in
the 1990s, partly as a result of Crawford Fund and 2020 efforts.  In the United States,
USAID’s unrestricted core support to the CGIAR was cut nearly in half between 1992
and 1996, to a level of just $22.4 million, then increased in 1997 to $26 million (most of
this increase being in support of expanded research linkages with U.S. universities). 
USAID attributes this small and belated recovery in research outlays mostly to the impact
of FAO’s World Food Summit.  This wide variety of observed trends reinforces the
impression that 2020, along with other events of the mid-1990s, produced different
impacts among different donors.External Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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GOVERNMENTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD
Governments in the developing world were not the primary target of 2020 in
Phase I, so we should not necessarily expect large policy action impacts within this
audience group.  Nor can we easily attribute to 2020 some of the policy actions that were
taken by this group.    
Some of the developing-country policy actions called for under 2020 included de-
regulating markets, enforcing rules and property rights, working with NGOs, ensuring
local participation, delegating policy responsibility to local authorities, and making policy
predictable and transparent.  Many developing countries have been taking such reforms in
the 1990s, but attributing such actions to the 2020 Vision initiative can be problematic,
for at least two reasons.  First, the period of most intense market-oriented reform among
developing-country governments came in the mid-1980s, a decade before the 2020 Vision
was launched.  Second, the influence of the 2020 initiative in the area of market reforms
has been completely swamped by far more powerful forces and actors, including
pressures from international financial markets and from international financial institutions
(such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund).  
When looking for distinctive markers of 2020 influence within the developing
world, one possible set of actions to consider would be spending on agricultural research. 
Here, IFPRI’s 2020 Vision did stake out a strong and distinctive position.  IFPRI’s 2020
Vision advised developing-country governments to spend more of their own resources on
research:  
If the 2020 Vision is to be realized... low-income developing countries
must sharply expand their investments in agricultural research.  A
minimum target of 1 percent of the value of total agricultural output is
appropriate for most low-income developing countries, with a longer-term
(5–10 year) target of 2 percent (IFPRI 1995, 29)
IFPRI’s 1 percent goal presented a significant challenge, because up until the early
1990s, the developing countries as a whole were spending only about 0.5 percent of their
agricultural GDP on agricultural research.  Some middle-income developing countries
(such as Malaysia or Thailand) were spending 0.6–0.7 percent of agricultural GDP on
research, but other less wealthy countries (such as Pakistan or the Philippines) were
spending only about 0.2 percent.  Particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, where research
spending was low and where the rate of growth of that spending had recently fallen (from
a healthy 2.5 percent rate of growth in the 1970s to a sluggish 0.8 percent growth rate in
the 1980s), meeting the IFPRI goal was going to require a major turnaround in existing
trends (Alston, Pardey, and Roseboom 1998).  Still, given the extremely high returns toExternal Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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agricultural research in developing countries (rates of return above 50 percent are not
unusual), it would be significant if the 2020 Vision initiative increased research
investments in poor countries by even a small amount.
A comprehensive estimate of 2020 impacts in this area is unfortunately beyond
the reach of this report, in part because recent data from the 1990s on agricultural
research and development spending by national governments are not easily available in
one centralized location, and in part because of a natural lag in policy action response.  If
the 2020 Vision were to have an impact on research spending in developing countries,
that impact might not be seen in the form of actual budget outlays for several more years.  
The evidence that is available to confirm a 2020 impact on actual research and
development spending levels in developing countries is not strong.  In some cases where
2020 materials did seem to influence the debate over research spending levels (for
example, within the African Development Bank and the governments of Egypt and India),
within the Government of Egypt, and within in the Government of India), it has not been
possible to gather actual data on recent spending levels.  Specialists suspect that since the
early 1990s in most countries the "research intensity ratio" (spending as a share of
agricultural GDP) has gone down rather than up.  In several exceptional cases—including
Brazil and China—agricultural R&D spending was to some extent revived in the 1990s,
but from exceptionally low levels and without 2020 playing a visible role.  In Brazil, the
final passing of the 1980s debt crisis was more important to reviving agricultural R&D
spending than 2020.  In China, the food price and import dependence scare of the mid-
1990s was decisive.  China, in 1991, spent only 0.36 percent of its agricultural GDP on
research.  In subsequent years it did improve on that performance, and IFPRI may have
played some role in this improvement through a 1992 report on Chinese R&D (Fan and
Pardey 1992), but this report was written before 2020 was launched.
In Nepal, public investments in agricultural R&D have increased significantly
since 2020’s 1995 regional vision seminar in Kathmandu, but the increase was from an
exceptionally low level, and it was mostly due to the arrival of several large World Bank
loans, plus some accounting idiosyncrasies surrounding bilateral assistance flows from
Great Britain.  In Africa, efforts through 2020 to boost national investments in
agricultural research and development have been stymied in the 1990s in part by the
nonsupportive role of the donor community.  Agricultural research in Africa is heavily
dependent on donor funding (traditionally 61 percent in francophone countries and 36
percent in anglophone countries outside South Africa) and when that funding
declines—as it has in the 1990s—national governments are seldom able or inclined to
make up the difference with their own resources. External Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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At some point, after more time has passed, it will be useful to take a more
comprehensive look at the most recent national agricultural research spending trends, to
look for evidence of impacts from Phase I of 2020.  A more appropriate approach would
probably be to examine these trends, some time in the future, within countries that had
committed themselves to participation in the subregional networks of Phase II of 2020.
ANTICIPATED IMPACTS FROM PHASE II OF 2020
The analysis until now has focused on Phase I of the 2020 Vision initiative, which
operated from 1993–96.  Phase II of 2020, initiated in January 1997, is still too young to
permit a confident impact evaluation.  We can, however, examine some of the most
important Phase II activities to date, and then anticipate how their impacts might differ
from the various impacts seen so far following Phase I.
As noted above, in Phase II of 2020 some already established activities will
continue.  IMPACT modeling will continue with various refinements and improvements,
and some of the international communication and consensus-building efforts that
characterized Phase I will be continued as well.  2020 publications in Phase II will
include fewer “synthesis” papers and more papers on emerging issues, such as food
safety, the role of livestock, and biotechnology.  Authorship of these Phase II papers will
become more diverse, with greater emphasis placed on spokespersons from the NGO
community.  As noted above, policy briefs will be published in “collections” around
controversial topics, with a range of views represented.
What sets Phase II apart, however, is its emphasis on country-level work. 
Developing-country leaders themselves, in Phase I of 2020, asked that more attention be
given by IFPRI to national-level visioning efforts.  IFPRI agreed, and concluded that “The
2020 Vision will only be realized if individual countries in the developing world conduct
their own 2020 Vision-type research and outreach activities and engage in their own 2020
Vision-type dialogue within their own policymaking circles...” (IFPRI 1998).  
With support from DANIDA, IFPRI’s 2020 staff in 1998 undertook the formation
of two subregional networks, one in East Africa and one in West Africa.  The East
African network includes participation by country teams of policy officials and
technocrats from Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, and (as an observer
thus far) Ethiopia.  The West African network initially includes participation by Benin,
Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Senegal, Togo, and (as an observer) Niger. 
The first formal meetings of these two subregional networks were held in Entebbe and
Accra in October 1998, with IFPRI’s director general and 2020 coordinator in attendance.External Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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This national-level activity has a strong rationale, since the policy instruments
most important for reaching the 2020 Vision goal (including the power to tax, spend, or
regulate inside the rural sector of the economy) are all in the hands of national
governments.  Where national policies falter, donor policies may have little chance to
succeed, international financial institutions and private investors will stay away, and
eventually NGOs may have to shift from development to relief.   
The goal of the policy networks is to move the 2020 initiative beyond its donor-
centric origins and get ownership of the visioning process into the hands of developing-
country policy elites.  Handing over ownership to developing-country elites will not be
easy, if the larger experience of the CGIAR system is any guide; only 4 percent of
funding for core CGIAR programs comes from developing countries, and fewer than 10
percent of attendees at annual Centers Week meetings are delegates from governments in
the developing world.  What progress has been made toward this Phase II 2020 objective
so far?
SUBREGIONAL NETWORKS IN THEORY
The creation and operation of IFPRI’s subregional networks will go through
several phases (There will be a Phase I and a Phase II for the networks, just as there is for
2020 itself).
< As the first step, IFPRI’s 2020 leadership in Washington used DANIDA funding
to plan, organize, and finance the creation of small country-level “teams”
consisting of individual researchers and policy technocrats.  Most of the team
leaders were western trained, previously known to IFPRI, and comfortable with
IFPRI’s 2020 Vision, but the selection of the teams themselves—which vary in
size from just two or three people to perhaps a dozen—was not under IFPRI’s
control.  Each of these teams was then tasked with drafting a separate “Country
Note,” to be presented at a subregional workshop—either in Entebbe or in
Accra—in October 1998.
< In a second step, country teams will revise their country notes and identify
separate country-level priorities for future research activities, training, capacity-
strengthening, and dissemination.  At the same time IFPRI’s 2020 staff will draft
subregional “proposals,” drawing upon cross-country themes that were identified
at the subregional network meetings.
< In a third step (originally intended to take place February–March 1999), country
teams, with IFPRI support, will conduct one-day “in-country seminars” intendedExternal Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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to communicate country-level priorities and cross-country themes to national
policymakers, and also to donors.  
This project design is intended to encourage country-level “ownership” of the
initiative, including the research and policy priorities being identified through the
initiative.  All drafts of country notes are being done by independent country team
members, not IFPRI staff.  Secondarily, this approach is intended to stimulate contact and
coordination among like-minded researchers and technocrats across countries within
subregions.  Within both East and West Africa, this sort of coordination across countries
is both useful for sound policy analysis and reassuring to the donor community.
IFPRI’s research output and IFPRI’s research staff in Washington, D.C. were a
critical component of 2020’s Phase I, but in the network portion of Phase II, it is donor
funding (primarily from DANIDA) plus the talent and initiative of IFPRI’s administrative
staff that provide most of the fuel.  IFPRI’s research staff are significantly disconnected
from the management operation of the networks. This disconnection is intentional; its
purpose was to give officials and researchers in developing countries more space to take
their own initiatives.  
The impact of these network activities is difficult to assess at this early point in
the process.  To some extent these activities are investments in longer term personal and
institutional relationships in the region, and a full impact assessment may not be possible
for a decade or more.  Some preliminary observations can be made, however.  On the
strength of what has taken place so far in the subregional networks, it is clear that some
dangers have been successfully avoided, and a foundation is being laid for potentially
significant future gains.  
DANGERS AVOIDED
Outsiders seeking to create new institutions in Africa must avoid several dangers. 
Most of all, when they bring in resources to create new institutions they must take care
not to undermine the operation of existing institutions.  In Africa, where so many donors
are active, it is important, when creating a new network, not to undermine the activities of
existing networks.  In the area of East African agriculture, by one count, there are already
18 different agricultural research and policy networks in place—including 3 different
networks for upland forest management alone.  Care must also be taken not to ask too
much of local counterparts.  Governments in Africa have meager budgets for policy
analysis, and in some policy areas (such as food and agriculture) there may be only a
small number of trained analysts experienced in dealing effectively with international
institutions or the donor community.  These specialists are under enormous pressure toExternal Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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deliver proposals to donors and technical advice to their ministers.  When IFPRI asks
such analysts to prepare original “country notes,” travel to participate in international
workshops, and then plan in-country seminars, it is making new demands on a scarce
resource.  If the result is either duplication or distraction from analytic efforts already
under way, then the scarce time of these valuable country-level specialists may not have
been used well.
Judging from first-hand observations at the East Africa subregional network
workshop held in Entebbe in October 1998, IFPRI has successfully avoided such dangers
so far.  The process of country note preparation complemented rather than detracted from
the other responsibilities of country team members, and supplemented rather than
undercut the activities of other policy networks in the region.  For a detailed review of
how these potential dangers were overcome, based on first hand observations from the
Entebbe network meeting, see the Appendix to this report.
POTENTIAL FOR POSITIVE GAINS
Having overcome some potential dangers, IFPRI’s 2020 Vision networks in
Africa now face the problem of delivering tangible gains.  These networks are already a
gain for IFPRI’s own institutional visibility in the region, but do they promise any gains
for the region itself?  Here we can draw a distinction between gains for the region that
must be continuously sustained from the outside, through a combination of IFPRI staff
resources and donor funding, versus gains for the region originally catalyzed by 2020, but
then sustained internally, without a need for continued external support.  IFPRI’s Phase II
2020 activities in Africa are well on their way to providing the first kind of gain.  They
will face a number of difficult challenges in providing the second kind of gain.
Externally Supported Gains
IFPRI’s support for subregional networks can produce a positive regional and
country-level impact for as long as the support continues.  This impact will come, first,
from increased utilization of human resources that are already trained in food and
agricultural policy and in place in Africa but underfunded and undernetworked (and
hence insufficiently utilized).  While training is still inadequate overall, many African
countries do have a top layer of world-class food policy and agricultural policy
technocrats currently in place within their ministries or universities.  These individuals
might typically be PhD’s in agricultural economics, trained at a top western institution
(such as Michigan State University) 10–15 years ago.  They are now less effective than
they could be, for lack of financial, informational, or networking resources.  As internal
and international funding for agriculture has dried up in recent years in Africa, and as theExternal Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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focus of most international financial institutions has shifted from sector-specific expertise
to a fixation on the macroeconomy, these talented and well trained agriculturalists have
had trouble staying in touch with wider international research and policy networks.  In
many cases they have consequently lost status within their own countries, making them
less effective advocates for food and agricultural policy.  IFPRI’s 2020 networking
activities are a useful source of renewed empowerment for these weakened agriculturalist
technocrats. 
The subregional quality of the networks is also important, since in the future
Africa’s food markets and food marketing policies across subregions will almost certainly
be more open and deeply integrated than they are today.  The talented individuals who
have been drawn into IFPRI’s 2020 networks are destined to take on more policy
responsibilities in the future as their careers mature, and when they finally rise to
positions of senior policy leadership, they will be able to face issues of regional and
subregional policy coordination knowing more about the public officials and institutions
of neighboring states.
IFPRI’s 2020 Phase II networking activities also help these in-country
agriculturalists re-connect to newly sympathetic funders in the donor community.  As it
becomes apparent to the donor community that agriculture needs more attention in Africa,
a search will begin for credible, fundable national agricultural development and
investment plans.  IFPRI’s 2020 networking activities are intended to provide just that: a
full set of forward-looking country “vision” papers, technically sophisticated and
regionally coordinated, yet locally authored, and already locally endorsed (at in-country
seminars) by key stakeholders.  In this sense, 2020 hopes to play a bit of a brokering role. 
It will help in-country agricultural technocrats, who need more resources, make a more
effective case in presenting their investment priorities and plans to those in the donor
community who are now looking for ways to revive agricultural and rural development
investments.  
It is still too early to evaluate with confidence the likely success of this brokering
strategy, since at this writing the country notes for East and West Africa have not all been
revised, and the in-country seminars have not yet been held.  Yet we can provide a high
rating for the fundamental logic and sophistication of the strategy itself.  It is a strategy
that recognizes the importance, to donors, of receiving technically sound and locally
generated (hence locally owned) funding proposals.  In Phase I of 2020 IFPRI worked
primarily within the donor community to boost the “demand” for new investments in
agriculture and rural development.  In Phase II of 2020, IFPRI is now working in Africa
to help produce a “supply” of credible, fundable investment proposals capable of
satisfying any new demands that do arise. External Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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Possible Gains Following Withdrawal of IFPRI Support
A much greater challenge for Phase II of 2020 in Africa will be sustaining gains in
the region once IFPRI’s own direct involvement comes to an end.  The dangers here are
obvious.  When the broker leaves, the relationship to the donor community might break
down.  
Without donor funding to cover regional coordination, travel, and conferencing
expenses, the networks would not have formed in the first place and probably would not
be able to continue.  And without administrative leadership from IFPRI’s 2020 staff, and
without personal involvement by IFPRI’s director general, donor funding might
disappear.  Agricultural technocrats in the donor community might be able to recognize
good proposals from African network members even if IFPRI were not presiding over the
process, but they would have trouble selling these proposals to skeptical non-
agriculturalists back home without the involvement and endorsement of IFPRI.  Without
continuing IFPRI involvement, the networks could be put at risk. 
Country team participants in the October 1998 East Africa workshop in Entebbe
made clear their own hopes for a deeper and more open-ended IFPRI commitment to
remain involved.  Whenever IFPRI staff mentioned a possible three-year time horizon for
IFPRI’s involvement, African counterparts would suggest that at least five years would be
more realistic.  IFPRI staff generated a nice list of “what IFPRI expects from the
individual countries in the network” (research collaboration, national coordination,
monitoring and evaluation, mobilization of resources, dissemination and advocacy, and
so forth), but the network members generated an even longer list of what they expected
from IFPRI, including coordination in the region, publication of work, methodological
support, support in fund raising, training, seed money, communications capacity building,
and support for establishment of national coordinators.  When the workshop ended there
was a sense among the African network participants that they would do their part—so
long as IFPRI did its part.  This kind of joint venture relationship could provide
substantial benefits in the region, as noted above, but IFPRI may have to remain a full
partner in the project for the benefits to continue.  
It may be entirely appropriate for IFPRI in Phase II of 2020 to take on these new
institutional roles, as a full partner with its newly created subregional networks in Africa,
and as a broker between the countries in those networks and the donor community.  The
impacts are likely to be positive and significant.  The trick will be to find a means,
eventually, to encourage more independence on the part of network members, and less
dependence on IFPRI’s involvement in the minds of the donor community as well. External Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
 The best way to summarize the overall impact of IFPRI’s 2020 Vision initiative
is to return to Table 1, the matrix of potential impacts presented earlier.  Drawing on the
many separate impacts that have now been mentioned in this report, we can provisionally
rate the overall impact of 2020 Phase I, for each of the cells of this matrix.  It is still too
early to provide such a summarizing judgment for the subregional policy networks, or for
other aspects of Phase II of 2020. 
When filling in these cells, I draw upon my own narrative and rate the impact of
2020 to date as either (in descending order) HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT, SIGNIFICANT,
NOTICEABLE, or NOT NOTICEABLE.  Table 2 presents summary ratings, using this
scale, that emerge from this report.
Note that the distribution of impacts summarized here is not entirely surprising. 
Audiences in column two were more heavily impacted than audiences in column three,
but this was to be expected, since it was all along the intent of Phase I to focus on
international as opposed to developing-country policy leaders.  Also, impacts on debate
and consensus formation were generally more visible than impacts on policy action in this
first phase of 2020, partly because action is more difficult to influence than debate and
partly because action tends to lag behind debate.
In one sense, the distribution of impacts shown in Table 2 is a bit surprising. 
IFPRI’s hope in Phase I of 2020 was primarily to reach and influence the "international"
audience in column two.  Less time and effort was devoted, in this first phase, to reaching
column three leaders who worked and lived exclusively within the developing world. 
Nonetheless, a significant number of such leaders were successfully reached in Phase I of
2020, and policy debate among these leaders was on some occasions even altered to a
noticeable degree.  When IFPRI launched 2020, its ability to reach and influence this
more remote audience in column three was uncertain.  The success achieved here in
Phase I of 2020 suggests that even stronger impacts on this column three audience should
be available in the subregional network activities of Phase II of 2020, where this audience
is the principal target from the start.  The only cell in this matrix where an impact from
Phase I of 2020 was "not noticeable" (the bottom right cell) is precisely where Phase II of
2020 intends to concentrate much of its effort.  
It can also be noticed along the way that IFPRI’s methods for generating the
various impacts summarized in Table 2 reflect well on everyone that has been associated
with the project.  At no time in this campaign to draw attention to food and agricultural
issues did IFPRI personnel bend their professional judgments on matters of substance; at
no time did they stoop to sensationalizing the hunger or poverty issue.  Indeed, whenExternal Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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world grain prices temporarily spiked upward in 1995–96, IFPRI staff participating in
2020 activities steadfastly refused to play on popular fears that the world was soon to run
out of food.  At a time when others were imagining the onset of global food shortages, the
2020 exercise predicted (correctly) that the upward spike in world prices would be strictly
temporary (ACIAR 1996, 26).  These high professional standards maintained by the 2020
initiative are one reason it came to be trusted by both donors and developing-country
policy leaders.   
As an additional concluding comment, we should note that we have not attempted
here to provide an estimate of the "cost effectiveness" of the 2020 initiative.  We have
sought to measure impact alone, without linking any of these individual impacts to the
associated program costs.  We can guess, however, that the cost-effectiveness of 2020 has
been extremely high, because significant impacts have been realized even though
program costs have remained exceptionally low (only about 5 percent of IFPRI total
annual budget).  
From the still somewhat early vantage point of 1999, then, the impacts of Phase I
of IFPRI’s 2020 Vision exercise have been at times highly significant and in most other
instances either significant or at least noticeable.  Where Phase I of 2020 did not produce
significant impacts, Phase II of 2020 is poised to step in.  And in all cases the cost-
effectiveness of 2020 activities in Phase I can be presumed to be high.Table 2—Matrix of impacts to date from 2020 Vision initiative, Phase I
Researchers and Educators International Policy Leaders Developing-Country Policy Leaders
Reach Highly Significant Impacts:  Numerous Highly Significant Impact:  Significant Impact: A significant
2020 materials were consumed by this Numerous 2020 materials were number of influential developing-
audience group, and then extended (for consumed by the most important country leaders did consume 2020
example, through classroom use) to members of this audience group.  materials and participate in 2020
other audience groups as well.  Many in the audience group were Vision activities, even though this
direct participants in 2020 Vision audience group was not the primary
activities.  target for Phase I.  
Catalyze consensus Not Examined:  Consensus building Significant Impact:  IMPACT Noticeable Impact:  Regional 2020
specifically within the research model projections and other visions were developed, refined, and
community was not stressed by 2020. materials from the 2020 Vision discussed for Africa, Latin America,
exercise became a visible part of and South Asia.  These documents plus
the policy debate, particularly in the a variety of other materials from Phase
case of some bilateral donors and I of 2020 did at times enter the policy
some sympathetic NGOs.  The debate inside some developing
2020 exercise also managed, at countries, strengthening the hand of
times, to engage skeptics and advocates for agriculture. 
nonagriculturalists. 
Catalyze  action Not Examined:  Catalyzing action by Noticeable Impact:  Aggregate Not Noticeable Impact:  Little evidence
the research community was not levels of multilateral and bilateral emerges of developing-country
stressed by 2020 donor support continued to fall governments changing their policies, or
during most of Phase I of 2020.  noticeably increasing their investments
Still, among some bilateral donors in agricultural research, in direct
where 2020 activities had been response to 2020 Phase I.   
most prominent and 2020 materials
most widely circulated, this fall was
either avoided or eventually halted
and reversed. Appendix
REVIEW OF  EAST AFRICA SUBREGIONAL NETWORK MEETING
Entebbe, October 1998
The five separate country teams that prepared draft country notes for the Entebbe
workshop organized their own efforts in diverse ways.  Uganda  took the most ambitious
course, by assembling as its country team a “task force” that included high-ranking
representatives of that nation’s Economic Policy Research Centre (EPRC), the Ministry
of Agriculture, the Agricultural Policy Secretariat, the National Agricultural Research
Organization, a national farmers association, Parliament, and the Office of the Vice
President.  Each member of this team  wrote a portion of the final draft country note and
presented that portion at a “national consultative workshop” at EPRC in July 1998.  It
should be noted how rare it is in most countries (including some donor countries) to see
senior representatives from so many diverse institutional constituencies come together for
substantive discussions on policy priorities in the area of food, agriculture, rural poverty,
and the environment.  If the subregional networks can continue to catalyze this sort of
broad national-level policy dialogue in countries such as Uganda, that achievement alone
could justify its efforts.
The national-level efforts of the Uganda country team have not apparently
detracted from other national-level planning and visioning efforts.  In fact, Ugandan
officials were already engaged with UNDP in an economy-wide visioning effort (not just
food and agriculture) called “Vision 2025,” and Uganda’s 2020 country note on food and
agriculture can now be fed efficiently into that other visioning process. A representative
of the 2525 project in Uganda was included on the 2020 vision task force to ensure
effective information sharing between these efforts.
The Tanzania country note was not based upon such an ambitious process.  It was
based on “consultations” with stakeholders.  Prior to the Entebbe workshop the authors of
the Tanzania paper did present a version at a workshop in Dar, but the Tanzania paper
was less of a jointly written consensus document.  This came through in some of the
national policy goals laid out in the paper, including a dubious plan to increase the
agricultural share of total government spending sixfold.  As in Uganda, however, the
Tanzania country note was complementary with rather than competitive with other policy
planning activities underway, including once again an economywide “Vision 2025”
exercise with UNDP. 
The drafting of the Mozambique country note, by two well-connected academics,
was apparently useful in getting that country’s agriculture minister to participate in a
forward-looking policy exercise (since the country note was vetted, and edited, through
the ministry).  The final version of the country note is also expected to get careful
attention at the political level, since the government has been positioning itself forExternal Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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upcoming elections.  The government of Mozambique is comfortable using IFPRI as a
venue for forward-looking policy work, having contracted with IFPRI to produce a
national “food sector strategy” in 1996. Mozambicans acknowledge that their policy
planning resources are stretched thin, obliging them to “pick and choose” between the
large number of international and regional networks available to them.  They have valued
the policy advice and information they get from IFPRI, in part as a counterpoint to what
they get from the World Bank, since they embraced a more liberal set of economic
policies in 1992.
The Kenya country note presented at the Entebbe workshop was a remarkable
paper, because it focused so heavily (and unexpectedly) on the issue of “governance.” 
This paper, authored and presented at Entebbe by some of Kenya’s top agricultural policy
technocrats, was implicitly a criticism of political leadership within Kenya itself.  The
Kenyan country team leaders appeared to value the opportunity, presented by the Entebbe
workshop, to get this criticism of their own policy system out on the table.  IFPRI
normally seeks to avoid governance issues, so as to avoid jeopardizing its necessary
working relationships with some of the governments in question.  It was healthy for this
topic to arise spontaneously at the workshop; it was a sure sign that the country teams
IFPRI had recruited were not simply reiterating official policy rhetoric.
The Malawi country note was an interesting document because it borrowed so
heavily from an already existing “Malawi Vision 2020” project, once again a national
visioning and planning effort sponsored in part through UNDP.  The UNDP process is
highly participatory and based on a distinctive five-step “African futures” methodology
that originated in Côte d’Ivoire.  This parallel economywide visioning process was
launched in Malawi in early 1996, and the outcome received a presidential endorsement
in the spring of 1998.  However, most government officials (outside of the planning
ministry) remained somewhat outside the process.  The agriculturalists on Malawi’s 2020
country team valued the Entebbe workshop in part because it gave them a chance to
publicize the food and farm sector goals of this earlier visioning exercise, and in part
because of their expectation that Malawi’s director of planning for agriculture (who was
sent to attend the workshop by his boss, a principal secretary in the Ministry of Planning)
will now be able in several ways to do a better job advocating for agriculture inside the
ministry.  He will have substantive information from the workshop itself to report, and he
will also be able to point to the strong possibility of future donor funding for Malawi if a
country-level consensus document can be produced and convincingly endorsed.  This sort
of advocacy for agriculture will also feed into the larger government planning process in
Malawi, where expenditures for the important but politically weak agricultural sector
must every year be defended against those calling for alternative uses of scarce public
sector resources.External Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision
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We also see evidence that IFPRI’s new subregional network in East Africa has so
far not significantly undercut the activities of other related policy networks in the region. 
The greatest danger here was a competition for resources between IFPRI’s new network
and an existing Eastern and Central Africa Programme for Agricultural Policy Analysis
(ECAPAPA), which is in turn a recently created policy analysis unit for yet another
network, the Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in Eastern and Central
Africa (ASARECA).  IFPRI’s solution to this potential competition has been to run its
East Africa subregional network in a “partnership” with ECAPAPA.  In the ECAPAPA
countries in the region, existing secretariats will be used for 2020 operations.  Only in
non-ECAPAPA countries will 2020 have to create new secretariats. 
This solution makes good sense for both partners in the short run, since
ECAPAPA is a network with a coordinator in Entebbe and an electronic newsletter, but
only a small budget, while IFPRI’s 2020 operation came to the region with a more
significant budget but with no network.  A smooth working connection between 2020 and
ECAPAPA has been maintained so far through the efforts of senior influential leaders in
the region, especially Harris Mutio Mule, who chairs the steering committee of
ECAPAPA while also serving as a senior consultant to IFPRI on the 2020 networks, and
as a member of the 2020 IAC. 
In the longer term there is some risk to ECAPAPA from the new 2020 initiative in
the region.  IFPRI’s better financed and better staffed 2020 operations in the region could
stunt the independent capacity and reputation of ECAPAPA.  Already ECAPAPA seems
to have fallen into the role of a somewhat passive junior partner.  When IFPRI in several
years completes its 2020 work in the region, ECAPAPA may be left a weaker
organization than it was when IFPRI first arrived.  Both IFPRI and ECAPAPA staff are
aware of this danger, and are already talking about ways to “fold 2020 into ECAPAPA”
when the 2020 project is finally terminated.  REFERENCES
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